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ABSTRACT
This study examines the GLOBE cultural dimensions of institutional collectivism, ingroup collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance to evaluate the impact of
national culture on cost of equity capital for firms cross-listing on two stock exchanges. In
addition to evaluating the direct effect of culture on cost of equity capital, the study examines
the moderating effect of national culture on impact of the political/regulatory environment and
disclosure on cost of equity capital. Limited support was found for both the direct effect and
the moderating effect of national culture on cost of equity capital.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
In order to take advantage of opportunities for growth and expansion, firms need access
to capital. Equity capital is an important source of external capital, which makes the cost of
equity capital important to chief financial officers and treasurers (Bierman Jr., 2010). Cost of
equity capital refers to the return on investment expected by shareholders, and is a function of
perceived risk. When risks are high, rational investors require larger returns as compensation
for the additional risk.
Huang and Ritter (2009) find that publicly traded U.S. firms use relatively more equity
than debt to meet their financing needs when the perceived cost of equity capital is low.
Extant literature in accounting and finance has investigated predictors of cost of equity capital.
These predictors include industry, firm size, relative distress, stock volatility, degree of leverage,
information asymmetry, and the regulatory, political, and economic environments in which the
firm operates. These factors affect all companies regardless of where they list their stock.
Some firms raise equity capital by listing on exchanges outside the home country. This
practice is referred to as cross-listing. Cross-listing is a way to gain access to greater amounts of
equity capital than can be found in the home market (Bancel & Mittoo, 2001)1. For cross-listing

1

The literature documents a number of reasons firms choose to cross-list. These reasons fall into two major
categories – market segmentation and bonding . Market segmentation refers to barriers that impede the free flow
of capital between markets. The two primary characteristics of market segmentation include regulatory barriers
(Errunza & Miller, 2000; Saudagaran, 1977), and information barriers (Saudagaran, 1977). Coffee (2002)identifies
the primary purpose of bonding as signaling a firm’s intention to respect minority shareholders’ rights through
stricter, more transparent financial reporting, improved disclosure, and enhanced scrutiny by regulatory bodies
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other intermediaries (underwriters and analysts). A
complete consideration of market segmentation and bonding are beyond the scope of this paper, and subject to
future research.
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firms, however, there is an additional risk factor that has been largely overlooked — the impact
of cultural differences between the home country and the host country(ies). Cultural
differences, as discussed later, can lead to misunderstandings that reduce trust and increase
perceived risk. This study extends the accounting and finance literatures related to risk and
cost of equity capital by including the international perspective of cultural difference as an
additional explanatory variable for cost of equity capital in cross-listed firms.
There is considerable evidence that cultural differences impact global companies in a
number of ways. For example, the management literature contains numerous examples of the
impact of cultural differences on entry modes (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005), subsidiary
performance measurement (Hamilton & Kashlak, 1999; Harrison, 1993), job satisfaction (Testa,
Mueller, & Thomas, 2003), and management style and employee performance measurement
(Entrekin & Chung, 2001; Vance, Shirley, McClaine, Boje, & Stage, 1992). The marketing
literature documents the cultural differences in consumer behavior and advertising
effectiveness (Bulmer & Buchanan-Oliver, 2006; Dawar & Parker, 1994; Morris Kalliny & Gentry,
2007; M. Kalliny & Gentry, 2010) product adaptation (Calantone, Cavusgil, Schmidt, & Shin,
2004) and product diffusion (Kumar & Krishnan, 2002). The accounting and finance literatures
find cultural differences in accounting systems (Gray, 1988; Harrison & McKinnon, 1986),
earnings management , audit results(K. H. Chan, Lin, & Lai Lan Mo, 2003) , tax systems
(Richardson, 2007), disclosure (Francis, Khurana, & Pereira, 2005), cross-listing choice (Pagano,
Raell, & Zechner, 2002), and capital structure (Andy C. W. Chui, Lloyd, & Kwok, 2002).
In addition to impacting global companies directly, there is evidence from the
governance literature suggesting that national culture affects how a country’s regulatory,
2

political, and economic environments evolve. As previously mentioned, these three factors are
related to investor risk, and therefore to the cost of equity capital. For example, Gorga (2006)
find national culture impacts legal reform and enforcement. National culture has also been
found to affect governance norms (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007) and investor
protection (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). Rajan and Zingales (2003) contend that the political
environment impacts countries’ growth, particularly with respect to financial markets. Other
studies find that cultural differences impact public policy implementation (Meuleman, 2010),
political party creation and mobilization (Kriesi et al., 2006), and socio-political unrest (von
Feigenblatt, 2009).
To summarize, the literature across several disciplines posits that cultural differences
affect global business. Different cultures have different behavioral norms, preferences, and
expectations. When different cultures interact with each other, value, behavior, and
communication differences may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations are likely to
occur (Pothukuchi, Damanpour, Choi, Chen, & Park, 2002), which may reduce trust and
increase uncertainty. In turn, reduced trust and increased uncertainty raises perceived risk.
Given that cross-listed firms are raising equity in two (or more) countries, the uncertainties
created by cultural differences are likely to impact the cost of equity capital in these firms. The
larger the cultural difference, the greater the potential for misunderstandings that are likely to
lead to higher levels of perceived risk. Therefore, larger cultural differences are likely to result
in larger impacts on cost of equity capital. If this is the case, then cultural differences should
be considered by management when making decisions about where to cross-list. However, the
role of cultural differences on the cost of equity capital in cross-listed firms has not yet been
3

examined. For this reason, it is not clear how, if at all, cultural differences impact cost of equity
capital. This gap leads to the following research questions:
1) Is there a relationship between the size of the cultural difference between the home
and host countries and the cost of equity capital in cross-listed firms?
2) If there is a relationship between cultural difference and the cost of equity capital in
cross-listed firms, is the effect direct or indirect? Does the size of cultural difference
have a direct impact on cost of equity capital, or does the size of cultural difference
impact cost of equity capital by moderating the effect of the impact of certain country
level equity cost risk-factors?
1.2 Contributions
The literature supports a relationship between cultural differences and multiple aspects
of business operations and business environments. However the extant literature has not
examined the effect of cultural differences on cost of equity capital, nor has the possible
moderating effect of cultural differences on recognized country level equity capital cost risk
factors been explored.
This study seeks to extend current knowledge in two ways: first, by examining the direct
effect of the size of cultural differences on cost of equity capital in cross-listed firms and
second, by examining the size of cultural differences as a moderator of the relationship
between three country level risk factors that affect the cost of equity capital: information
asymmetry (disclosure), the regulatory environment, and the political environment.
This topic is important from a theoretical perspective because it extends our knowledge
about how the size of cultural differences impact business operations – in this case, the cost of
raising equity funds for operations and expansion. From a practical perspective, this work
provides insight that may help financial managers choose where to cross-list their companies’
stocks.
4

1.3

Overview of Remaining Chapters
The literature related to national culture and cost of equity capital is reviewed in

Chapter 2. The literature review is organized as follows: Section 2.1 defines and describes the
dependent variable in this study, cost of equity capital. Section 2.2 defines risk and summarizes
the literature related to the major risk factors for cost of equity capital. Section 2.3 provides an
overview of national culture and two well-known cultural frameworks. Section 2.4 provides an
overview of the finance and accounting literatures related to the impact of national culture on
accounting and finance decisions. Section 2.5 provides an overview of the literature related to
the impact of national culture on the three country level risk factors considered in this study:
information asymmetry, the regulatory environment, and the political environment. Section
2.6 provides an overview of other factors that are related to cost of equity capital. Section 2.7
provides an overview of the theoretical bases of this study and develops the hypotheses to be
tested.
The research methodology for this study is discussed in Chapter 3. Operationalizations
and measures of each construct in the empirical model are explained, and the sources of data
are discussed. The results of the empirical analyses are presented in Chapter 4. The discussion
of the results, limitations, and conclusions are presented in Chapter 5.

5

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Cost of Equity Capital
The cost of equity capital is the focus of this study. Cost of equity capital refers to the
return demanded by investors (shareholders) on their investment in a company. Investors
expect higher returns on their investment when risk is high; therefore, the cost of equity capital
is a function of risk. The accounting and finance literatures have identified several risk factors
related to cost of equity capital. These risk factors are discussed later in this chapter.
2.2 Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital
Risk refers to the possibility of financial loss, which may be either absolute or relative to
investor expectations (Oxford University Press, 2008). As risk increases, investors demand
greater returns, which results in higher costs of equity capital for firms. The accounting and
finance literatures have identified a number of risk factors that impact the cost of equity
capital. These risk factors can be classified as occurring at the firm level, the industry level, or
the country level. Firm level risk factors include firm size (Banz, 1981; Fama & French, 1992a),
stock volatility (Brigham, 1989, p. 123), and degree of leverage (Fama & French, 1992; Hail &
Leuz, 2006). Industry has also been found to impact cost of equity capital (Conrad & Plotkin,
1968; Fama & French, 1997; Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan, 2001; Gregory & Michou, 2009).
Country level risk factors include information asymmetry (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia,
2001), the regulatory environment (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998),
the political environment (Rajan & Zingales, 2003), and the economic environment .
Information asymmetry is treated a country level variable in this study because the amount of
information cross-listed firms are required to provide, in the form of financial statement
6

disclosures, is determined by the rules of the stock exchange(s) the firm trades on. In this
study, cultural difference is proposed as an additional risk factor that affects cost of equity
capital in cross-listed firms.
2.3 National Culture and Selected Cultural Frameworks
National culture has been defined in several ways by various authors. At its root,
national culture refers to acceptable behavioral norms within a society. Hofstede defines
national culture as “…the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members
of one group or category of people from another,” (2001, p. 9). House et al. (2004) define
national culture as shared understandings that influence the actions of members of a society.
Sousa and Bradley (Sousa & Bradley, 2008) describe national culture as societal characteristics
that affect norms, values, and institutions.
Regardless of how national culture is defined, there is clear evidence in the international
business literature, as briefly discussed in the introduction, that differences between cultures
impact global businesses. Sousa and Bradley summarize the risk created by cultural difference
as the “sum of factors preventing or inhibiting the flow of information to and from the market,”
(2008, p. 467). This information disconnect may be a result of lack of transparency in financial
reporting between countries (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000) , or failure on the part of investors to
understand the information that is reported. These problems may lead to greater uncertainty
and distrust on the part of investors from different cultures, which in turn creates greater
perceived risk.
In order to measure cultural differences between countries, it is necessary to have
scaled dimensions of national culture. The most widely used framework of national culture in
7

the international business literature has been Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions .
More recently, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research
Program [GLOBE] (House et al., 2004) developed a national culture framework the authors
claim is “more comprehensive, cross-culturally developed, theoretically sound, and empirically
verifiable,” (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006) than Hofstede’s.
Not surprisingly, there is overlap between the cultural dimensions proposed by
Hofstede and those proposed by GLOBE. Both studies identify dimensions related to the
unequal distribution of power and wealth within a society (power distance), the response to
uncertainty (uncertainty avoidance), responsibility to one’s self versus responsibility to a group
(individualism/collectivism [Hofstede], in-group collectivism [GLOBE]), performance and success
(masculinity [Hofstede], performance orientation and assertiveness [GLOBE]), and the
preference for immediate rewards versus future rewards (short-term/long-term orientation
[Hofstede], future orientation [GLOBE]). GLOBE identifies three additional dimensions:
institutional collectivism, humane orientation, and gender egalitarianism. Institutional
collectivism may be thought of as the professional perspective of individualism/collectivism and
in-group collectivism, and refers to the degree to which institutional practices reward collective
action and results. Humane orientation is related to the importance of the well-being of all
members of society. Gender egalitarianism is related to the degree to which opportunities are
free of gender bias. Hofstede’s and GLOBE’s dimensions are described in Table 1 and in
Appendix A.
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Table 1. Summary of Hofstede and GLOBE Cultural Dimensions
Author

Cultural Dimension

Description

Hofstede (1981, 2001) Power Distance

The degree to which unequal distribution of power is expected and accepted.

GLOBE (House et al., Power Distance
2004)
GLOBE (House et al., Humane Orientation
2004)
Hofstede (1981, 2001) Uncertainty Avoidance

The degree to which unequal distribution of power is expected and accepted.

GLOBE (House et al., Uncertainty Avoidance
2004)
Hofstede (1981, 2001) Individualism/Collectivism
GLOBE (House et al.,
2004)

Institutional Collectivism

GLOBE (House et al., In-group Collectivism
2004)
Hofstede (1981, 2001) Masculinity/Femininity

The degree to which society promotes the welfare of others. Humane orientation characteristics include fairness, altruism,
friendliness, kindness, and caring.
The degree of discomfort with uncertain situations. Societies high in uncertainty avoidance attempt to minimize
uncertainty by establishing formal and informal rules and norms.
The degree of discomfort with uncertain situations. Societies high in uncertainty avoidance emphasize orderliness,
consistency, procedures, and laws.
The degree of an individual’s responsibility to self versus responsibility to an in-group.
The degree to which institutional practices encourage and reward the collective distribution of resources and collective
action. Characteristics of institutional collectivism include an emphasis on performance and future-orientation through
consensus and team-building.
The degree to which individuals are connected to their immediate families and/or organizations. Characteristics of ingroup collectivism include close family ties, the subjugation of personal desires, and respect for authority.
The degree to which roles and behaviors are defined and separated along gender lines. Masculine roles and behaviors
include assertiveness, ambition, and concern with material success. Feminine roles and behaviors include modesty,
nurturing, and concern with quality of life over material success.
The degree to which assertive behavior and success is valued and rewarded. Characteristics of assertive behavior include
competitiveness, focusing on results, clear and direct communication, initiative, competition, and control.

GLOBE (House et al.,
2004)

Assertiveness

GLOBE (House et al.,
2004)
GLOBE (House et al.,
2004)

Gender Egalitarianism

The degree to which gender influences roles and opportunities.

Performance Orientation

Performance orientation refers to the degree to which achievement and success is valued and rewarded. Cultures high in
performance orientation value results, and exhibit characteristics such as assertiveness, initiative, competitiveness,
competence, and forthrightness. Cultures low in performance orientation value relationships and tradition over results,
and exhibit characteristics such as relationships, quality of life, harmony with the environment, modesty, cooperation, and
sympathy.
The degree to which immediate gratification is delayed in favor of future rewards. Cultures high in long-term orientation
value caution, planning, respect for tradition, and self-control.
The degree to which an emphasis on future outcomes is promoted. Cultures high in future orientation value long-term
strategic planning, self-control, tradition, delay of gratification, the development of long-term relationships, and
performance improvement.

Hofstede (1981, 2001) Long-term/Short-term
Orientation
GLOBE (House et al., Future Orientation
2004)
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This study uses selected GLOBE cultural dimensions to examine cultural differences
between home and host countries. House et al. (2004) conducted the GLOBE over a period of
approximately 10 years in 62 countries. Their results are based on responses from
approximately 17,000 managers in 951 organizations (2004, p. 3). GLOBE was chosen for two
reasons. First, the GLOBE measures are more recent than Hofstede’s measures. Hofstede
contends that national culture changes very slowly. If this is true, using the more recent GLOBE
measures does no harm. If national culture changes somewhat more quickly than anticipated,
there is value in using the most recent data available. Second, the GLOBE study collected data
from managers in a much larger number of organizations than Hofstede. This diversity should
create a richer set of responses, resulting in a more robust dataset.
To summarize, the GLOBE measures were chosen because they are based on a larger,
more diverse sample that was collected more recently. Therefore, the GLOBE measures
overcome, to some extent, criticisms concerning both the source and age of Hofstede’s
measures (Kim & Gray, 2009).
2.4 National Culture in the Accounting and Finance Literature
Section 2.3 briefly discussed national culture and two widely recognized cultural
frameworks, Hofstede (1980, 2001) and GLOBE (House et al., 2004). In this section, the
literature examining the impact of national culture in accounting and finance is summarized.
In the accounting and finance literatures, cultural studies2 have spanned a wide variety
of topics. Several accounting systems studies have proposed theoretical frameworks
describing how national culture influences accounting systems (Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Gray,
2

The majority of accounting and finance literature exploring cultural differences has been based on Hofstede’s
(1980,2001) cultural dimensions. A summary of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can be found in Appendix A.
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1988; Harrison & McKinnon, 1986). Gray’s (1988) model proposed a theoretical framework in
which Hofstede’s (1980) cultural values were directly related to the core accounting values of
professionalism, uniformity, conservatism, and secrecy. These accounting values, in turn, were
expected to be directly related to accounting system characteristics of authority, enforcement,
measurement, and disclosure.
Gray’s paper was unique because he developed a set of testable hypotheses that have
since been examined in numerous empirical studies, particularly with respect to disclosure
(Gray’s accounting value of secrecy)3. Although the results of the empirical studies have found
mixed support for Gray’s hypotheses, there is general agreement that national culture impacts
accounting systems and reporting.
Earnings management has also been examined through a cultural lens. Nabar and
Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) extended Leuz et al.’s (2003) model for measuring earnings
management by adding Hofstede’s (1980) cultural variables and Stulz & Williamson’s (2003)
religion (Catholic/not catholic only) and language (English/not English only) variables. They
found that countries relatively high in uncertainty avoidance were more likely to engage in
earnings management and that earnings management was practiced to a lower extent in
English speaking countries. The authors attributed this to native English speakers being more
likely to adhere to the strong investor protections and enforcement found in common law
countries because common law traditions were founded by English speaking societies. Doupnik
incorporated the same set of countries used by Leuz et al. (2003) to study the effect of culture
on two separate components of earnings management: management discretion and income

3

For an excellent summary of studies published through 2003, see Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004).
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smoothing. Of Hofstede’s (2001) five cultural characteristics, Doupnik found individualism to be
positively related to both management discretion and income smoothing, and uncertainty
avoidance to be positively related to income smoothing. Doupnik also found that culture had
greater explanatory power than institutions on earnings management. Han et al.’s (2010) study
examined how differences in individualism and uncertainty avoidance impacted the magnitude
of earnings management, and how the interaction between institutions and culture affected
earnings management. Using Gray’s (1988) theory as extended by Doupnik and Tsakumis
(2004) , Han et al. found that individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and the level of investor
protection impacted the degree and magnitude of earnings discretion, and thus earnings
management. Furthermore, individualistic managers were more likely to manage earnings than
uncertainty avoidant managers. As expected, strong investor protections generally reduced
earnings management. However, individualistic managers in countries with strong investor
protections tended to manage earnings to a greater extent than individualistic managers in
countries with weak investor protections, and uncertainty avoidant managers in countries with
strong investor protections were more likely to manage earnings to a greater extent than
uncertainty avoidant managers in countries with weak investor protections.
Culture has also been found to have an effect on audit results. For example, Chan et al.
(2003) examined the impact of individualism and power distance on the size of audit detected
accounting errors using a sample of companies from 15 countries operating in China. They
found, as expected, that the materiality of errors detected was greater in firms from countries
high in individualism and/or power-distance.

12

Richardson (2007) explored the relationship between tax systems and culture. He
looked at the impact of culture on four basic tax system values (equity, simplicity, visibility, and
neutrality). He found individualism to be positively related to all four tax values; uncertainty
avoidance to be negatively related to tax system simplicity, neutrality, and visibility; and power
distance to be negatively related to equity, neutrality, and visibility. There did not appear to be
relationships between masculinity and any of the tax system values.
Capital structure, defined as the relative use of debt and equity to finance company
operations, has also been examined from a cultural perspective. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and
Wald (1999) analyzed capital structure in developed countries. They found evidence of a
country effect acting on institutional characteristics and agency problems, which in turn
impacted capital structure. Booth et al. (2001)analyzed capital structure choices in developing
countries and found these choices were related to specific country factors. Chui et al. (2002)
argued that these country factors are related to national culture, and found that two of
Schwartz’s 4 (1994b) cultural values, conservatism and mastery, were related to capital
structure. In their study of multinational firms located in 26 countries, Ramirez and Kwok
(2009) found uncertainty avoidance and individualism were inversely related to the level of
debt in firms’ capital structure.
Chui et al. (2010) examined the relationship between individualism and country stock
return patterns. Specifically, they examined the profitability of momentum strategies in 50
countries. Momentum strategies are based on a phenomenon called the momentum effect –
meaning that stocks that have performed well (or poorly) in the past three to twelve months

4

A summary of Schwartz’s cultural dimensions can be found in Appendix A.
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tend to perform well (or poorly) in the following three to twelve months. Therefore, a
momentum strategy refers to the assembly of a portfolio of stocks that have recently
performed well. They found that average monthly profits on momentum portfolios were
positive and greater for countries high on individualism compared to countries low on
individualism for the first 12 months after portfolio creation. After the first 12 months,
however, return reversals on momentum portfolios were greater for highly individualistic
countries relative to countries low in individualism. They repeated their analyses using the
GLOBE study dimension of institutional collectivism and found the same results. They
concluded that individualism may explain, to some extent, the persistence of profitable
momentum strategies.
In summary, the accounting and finance literature recognizes, either directly or
indirectly, that accounting and finance decisions, as well as stock returns, are affected by
cultural differences. Accounting and financing decisions impact the cost of equity capital
because these decisions affect perceived risk. Accounting decisions may affect perceived risk
because they affect the reliability and clarity of the information reported in the financial
statements and to taxing authorities, as well as the likelihood of finding material errors in the
financial statements. Financing decisions may affect perceived risk because they may impact
the amount of funding available for ongoing operations and growth. This study seeks to extend
our knowledge concerning the effects of cultural differences by determining whether or not
cultural differences create an additional risk factor that affects cost of equity capital for firms
that list stocks on foreign exchanges.

14

2.5

Country Level Risk Factors
Section 2.4 briefly summarized national culture in the accounting and finance literature.

The accounting and finance literature suggests that cultural differences impact accounting and
tax systems, the incidence and magnitude of earnings management, audit results, and capital
structure. Each of these items affects perceived risk, and therefore impacts cost of equity
capital. In section 2.5, the literature related to the country level risk factors is summarized. The
literature relating national culture to these risk factors is also summarized.
2.5.1 Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry refers to the difference in the amount of relevant information
about a company that is available to management and/or controlling shareholders (insiders)
compared to financial intermediaries (such as analysts), and non-controlling shareholders and
other investors (outsiders) (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Information asymmetry affects risk because
it creates an agency problem - outsiders lack complete information, and monitoring costs are
increased (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Verrecchia, 2001). To understand the relationship
between information asymmetry and cost of equity capital, it is necessary to understand the
relationship between level of disclosure and cost of equity capital. The level of disclosure found
in the published financial statements of publicly traded companies is considered a major source
of information available to external users. For this reason, disclosure is typically used as a proxy
for information asymmetry. When disclosure levels are high, information asymmetry is low,
and cost of equity capital is relatively lower. Therefore, the relationship between disclosure
levels and cost of equity capital is negative. One commonly used measure of information
asymmetry is the level of financial statement disclosure scale developed by the Center for
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International Financial Accounting and Reporting (CIFAR). Other measures of information
asymmetry found in the literature include variations of the Annual Reviews of Corporate
Reporting Practices [AIMR reports](Botosan & Plumlee, 2002)and La Porta et al.’s (2006)
disclosure requirement index (Hail & Leuz, 2006) .
Botosan and Plumlee (2002)examined the relationship between expected cost of equity
capital and disclosure level. Their sample consisted of more than 3,000 firm year observations
(668 unique firms) taken from the AIMR reports between 1985 and 1996, and included firms
from 43 industries. They found a significant, consistent negative relationship between the level
of disclosure in annual financial reports and cost of equity capital. They did not find other types
of disclosures (quarterly reports and investor relation) to be significant. Their conclusion was
that investors and analysts are most concerned with the information provided in the annual
reports. Francis et al. (2005) studied the effect of voluntary disclosures on cost of equity and
debt capital in non-U.S. manufacturing firms. Their sample consisted of 672 firm year
observations (484 unique firms) taken from the CIFAR database for years 1993 and 1995.
Nineteen manufacturing industries located in 34 countries were represented. Consistent with
Botosan and Plumlee’s (2002) findings, Francis et al. found a negative relationship between
voluntary disclosure and both equity and debt capital, after controlling for country level macroeconomic and institutional factors. This study confirmed the negative relationship between
cost of equity capital and disclosure levels, and generalized the findings to non-U.S. countries.
Hail and Leuz (2006) examined the effect of required disclosure on ex-ante cost of equity
capital. Their sample consisted of 35,118 firm year observations from 40 countries spanning
the years 1992 through 2001. They then calculated country-year median values of cost of
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equity capital in order to compare cost of equity capital between countries. They found that
countries with more extensive disclosure requirements, in conjunction with stronger regulatory
systems (and firms in those countries), had significantly lower costs of equity capital.
Hope (2003) examined the relationship between culture, legal origins, and firm-level
disclosure levels on the accuracy of analyst predictions using a pooled sample of 1,309 firms in
42 countries. He included all four of Hofstede’s (1980) original cultural dimensions
(uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, masculinity) in his models. He found
that firms in countries low on uncertainty avoidance and/or high on individualism had higher
disclosure levels, even when controlling for country legal systems. These results led him to
conclude that “…it is too early to write off culture as an explanatory variable for annual report
disclosure levels,” . Although his study did not directly deal with disclosure levels and cost of
equity capital, it is important because it confirms the link between national culture and
disclosure levels, which complements the literature supporting the negative relationship
between cost of equity capital and disclosure levels. Hope’s study also suggests that different
cultural dimensions affect disclosure differently.
In summary, the literature supports the negative relationship between information
asymmetry, as measured by disclosure, and cost of equity capital at the firm and country levels.
This relationship is supported for both voluntary and required disclosures. Furthermore, there
is evidence that the level of disclosure is influenced by national culture. However, the
literature has not examined whether or not cultural differences moderate the effect of
information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
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2.5.2 The Regulatory and Political Environments
The regulatory environment refers to the protections offered to investors through the
legal system in the country or countries in which firms operate. It is one of the three pillars of
institutions described by Scott (2001). The regulative pillar is responsible for the construction,
implementation and enforcement of rules, which is the basis of a country’s regulatory
environment. The regulatory environment impacts risk because it governs stockholders’ rights
to protection and remediation, through the enforcement, under the law. There is a negative
relationship between the strength of the regulatory environment where a firm operates and
cost of capital. The strength of the regulatory environment is usually measured with validated
scales, such as the one developed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998).
La Porta et al. (1998) classified 49 countries as having legal systems based broadly on
either common or civil law traditions. They identified and compared the laws in each country
related to shareholder protections, particularly those of minority shareholders. Strong investor
protections reduced the risk borne by minority investors by offering recourse in the event of
actions taken by management and/or majority stockholders that decrease the overall value of
their investment. They found that those countries with legal systems based on common law
traditions offered much greater protections to investors both in terms of the laws themselves
and the enforcement of the laws. In a related study using the same 49 countries (La Porta et
al., 1997), the authors found that the regulatory environment also impacted the size of the
capital markets in countries. Countries with strong laws and enforcement had larger, better
developed capital markets, which may translate into lower cost of equity capital due to
increased liquidity resulting from a larger pool of investors. Coffee (2007) examined the
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literature related to the existence and enforcement of securities laws, and reached the
conclusion that the superior enforcement of securities regulations by the U.S. was a primary
reason foreign firms who listed their stocks on U.S. exchanges had lower costs of equity capital.
His rationale was that by listing on U.S. exchanges, foreign firms were bonding themselves to
the rigorous U.S. enforcement of securities laws.
Accounting standards refers to the rules and conventions used by firms to calculate
results reported on external financial statements, and are considered part of the regulatory
environment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Accounting standards are
indirectly related to cost of equity capital insofar as they impact perceived risk. Differences in
accounting standards between countries may impact investors’ ability to understand and
correctly interpret financial information, which is a form of information asymmetry. For
example, in late 2007 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to exempt foreign
companies trading on U.S. exchanges that prepare their financial statements in accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from the requirement to reconcile to U.S.
GAAP. The Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) of the American Accounting
Association [AAA] (2008)responded by pointing out that material reconciling items continue to
exist between GAAP and IFRS, which suggests that IFRS does not convey the same information
that U.S. GAAP does for U.S. investors. Furthermore, they state that different implementation
and enforcement standards exist among countries, which are likely to create differences in
reporting even when using the same reporting standards. A second way in which accounting
standards affect cost of equity capital is their use in calculating cost of equity measures. Cost of
equity measures are calculated using estimates of accounting earnings, which are affected by
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the accounting standards used. Accounting standards that are more conservative are expected
to result in lower calculated costs of equity capital (Witmer, 2008). Accounting standards are
typically measured based on Compustat classification of the accounting standards required for
publicly traded firms in the country of incorporation or on specific exchange reporting
requirements (Frost, Gordon, & Hayes, 2006).
The literature supports the negative relationship between the strength of the regulatory
environment, specifically investor protection and legal enforcement, and cost of equity capital.
In countries with strong investor protections and enforcement, investor risk is reduced, which
in turn reduces the cost of equity capital (Coffee, 2007). Scholars have begun to examine
national culture as an explanatory variable for both the existence and enforcement of laws
protecting minority shareholders. For example, Stulz and Williamson (2003) used language and
religion as proxies for culture in explaining differences in investor right protections in 49
countries. They found that culture explained cross-country differences in individual
shareholder rights after controlling for the legal origin of the countries’ legal systems. Licht et
al. (2007) contended that legal origin alone was not sufficient to explain differences in
governance between countries. They argued that national culture was also an important
explanatory variable. They used both Schwartz’s (Schwartz, 1994b) and Hofstede’s (1980,
2001) cultural dimensions to evaluate the effect of culture on three social norms of governance
— rule of law, corruption, and democratic accountability — in 50 countries. Rule of law refers
to limitations on how people with power are allowed to use that power. Corruption refers to
the use of authority to realize personal gains in spite of the law. Democratic accountability
refers to the requirement that those holding political power should be held to account for their
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decisions and actions. They found egalitarianism and intellectual/affective autonomy to be
positively related to rule of law and democratic accountability, and negatively related to
corruption, while embeddedness and hierarchy were negatively related to rule of law and
democratic accountability and positively related to corruption. Likewise, they found
individualism to be positively related to rule of law and democratic accountability and
negatively related to corruption, while power distance was negatively related to rule of law and
democratic accountability and positively related to corruption. They also found that legal origin
was not significant after considering the effect of culture. Gorga (2006) proposed that a
country’s national culture either supports institutional change or prevents it. She studied the
impact of the Brazilian corporate law reform of 2001 that was intended to strengthen minority
investor protections. She found that, even after the reform, no significant changes occurred in
either actual disclosures made or in monitoring. Additionally, there was no social pressure
calling for enforcement of the new legislation. In other words, in spite of improvements in
legislated protections of minority shareholders, the national culture had not changed, and
therefore no changes in enforcement accompanied the legislation.
In summary, the literature supports the negative relationship between cost of equity
capital and the strength of the regulatory environment, specifically with respect to investor
protection and enforcement. Furthermore, there is evidence that the regulatory environment
is influenced by national culture. However, the literature has not examined whether or not
cultural differences moderate the effect of the regulatory environment on the cost of equity
capital.
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The political environment refers to political stability of a country. In countries with
weak, corrupt, and bureaucratic governments, risk is greater because there is an increased
chance of internal and/or external conflicts, corruption, and government expropriations of
firms (Glambosky, Gleason, & Madura, 2010). There is a negative relationship between political
stability and cost of equity capital. Political stability is usually measured through validated,
multi-item scales such as those developed by the International Country Risk Group (ICRG).
There is evidence in the literature that political risk impacts cost of equity capital. Kelly
and Philippatos (1982)surveyed 136 financial executives of U.S. based manufacturing
multinational corporations (MNCs) ranked in the Fortune 500 for 1977. Results indicated that
political risks, particularly expropriation risk, were determinants in the selection of foreign
investment opportunities. Acheampong and Epperson (2001) examined tobacco and beverage
industries in seven industrialized nations. They used return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for cost
of equity capital, and found political risk and cost of debt were negatively related to ROE.
Glambosky et al. (2010) examined 509 firms listed on a U.S. exchange that acquired privatized
state owned enterprises (SOEs) from foreign governments between 1985 and 2002. Using
return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for cost of equity capital, they found risk was higher and
returns lower when SOEs were acquired from weak, unstable and/or bureaucratic
governments. Aggarwal and Goodell (2010)evaluated the preference for equity versus debt by
comparing market capitalization in 19 European countries. He found higher levels of equity
financing in more politically stable countries. Albrecht et al. (2007) identified 130 foreign
countries represented on New York (NYSE) and London Stock (LSE) exchanges in 2005. They
classified these countries as first-, second-, and third-world countries. They found that political
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risk was significantly related to the level of the country’s market capitalization in the NYSE and
LSE for both first- and third-world countries, which they felt suggested better access to foreign
exchanges and therefore better access to capital. As discussed in Chapter 1, better access to
capital is believed to reduce cost of equity capital.
There is also some evidence in the literature that national culture is related to a
country’s political environment. Inglehart (2000), based on World Value Survey data from the
1993-1995 wave, found that national culture was associated with democratic forms of
government. Specifically, he suggested that countries with democratic institutions were more
likely to emphasize self-determination, a cultural characteristic emphasizing tolerance and
greater levels of participative decision-making. He also emphasized that economic
development gradually leads to changes that favor democratic government, including improved
social structures (such as education, organizational networks, and greater income equality) and
a higher priority on self-expression and participation in decision-making, both of which tend to
favor democratic government forms. Lipset and Lenz (2000), also using World Value Survey
data, found that countries high on amoral familism tended to be more corrupt than countries
low on amoral familism. Amoral familism is a cultural characteristic in which family ties are
strong, but there is no loyalty to the larger community. This dimension is similar, although not
identical, to Hofstede’s (Hofstede, 1980, 2001) collectivism dimension and House et al.’s (2004)
in-group collectivism dimension. Rajan and Zingales (2003)argued that disclosure and impartial
enforcement reduce barriers to entrance and therefore reduce profits for large firms and
financial institutions already established in the host country, and democratic markets
jeopardize businesses that rely on unequal access to financing. Thus, they contend that
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political change can create a situation in which these “incumbent” institutions no longer enjoy
special treatment. Therefore, these organizations are likely to use their political power
(donations, lobbies, etc.) to maintain status-quo and hinder political change. Although Rajan
and Zingales’ study does not directly address national culture, a desire to maintain status-quo is
characteristic of Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) uncertainty avoidance and, to some degree, power
distance dimensions.
In summary, the literature supports a negative relationship between stable political
environments and cost of equity capital. Furthermore, there is some evidence that political
environment is influenced by national culture. However, the literature has not examined
whether or not cultural differences moderate the effect of political environment on cost of
equity capital.
2.6

Other Risk Factors
Section 2.5 explained how country level risk factors of information asymmetry (as

measured by disclosure levels), regulatory environment (as measured by investor protection
and enforcement of laws), and political environment (the stability of government) affect
perceived risk among potential investors, and therefore affect cost of equity capital. More
complete disclosure levels, greater investor protection, legal enforcement of investor related
laws, and stable, relatively corruption free governments are negatively related to cost of equity
capital. Furthermore, there is evidence that national culture influences all three of these
factors.
In Section 2.6, the literature related to other risk factors commonly identified as
impacting cost of equity capital is summarized.
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2.6.1 Firm Size
Firm size refers to relative size of the firm in the capital market, and impacts risk
because investors perceive large companies as being less likely to fail, and therefore less risky
to invest in, compared to small companies. Firm size is negatively related to cost of capital, and
has commonly been measured as the market value of the company (defined as the market
proportion of the security, or price multiplied by outstanding shares).
Banz (1981) examined common stocks quoted on the NYSE for a minimum of five years
between 1925 and 1975. Using market value as a proxy for firm size, he found that large and
mid-size firms had lower returns than very small firms. However, he cautioned that the true
factor might not be size, but rather some unknown factor or factors correlated with size. Fama
and French (1992a) examined all non-financial firms listed on major US exchanges (NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ) spanning 1963 to 1989. Like Banz, Fama and French also used market value as a
proxy for size. They consistently found that larger companies had lower costs of equity capital
(proxied by average returns on stock). They attributed this effect, at least partially, to the belief
that large companies were better able to weather economic difficulties than small companies.
They also tested the ratio of book value to market value of equity to determine if it captured
size effect in explaining average returns. They concluded that size effect was a separate factor.
Chan et al. (1991) analyzed monthly returns for stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock exchange
between 1971 and 1988. Their results confirmed the existence of a size effect, and they found
Japanese firms’ cost of equity capital was directionally consistent with U.S. firms – smaller firms
had higher equity capital costs. Not all empirical work supports the relationship between size
and cost of equity capital, however. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) found that
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firm size was only significant in explaining cost of equity capital when the effect of the bid-ask
spread was omitted from the analysis. Chan and Chen (1991) argued that it was not size per se,
but rather certain common characteristics of distressed firms that caused these firms to be
both smaller and to have higher equity capital costs.
To summarize, the literature has found mixed support for firm size as a risk factor,
although the negative relationship between size and cost of equity capital is supported.
2.6.2 Stock Volatility
Stock volatility refers to the magnitude of a particular stock’s price reaction to changes
in the general market (Brigham, 1989, p. 123) . Volatility is measured by beta value. Beta
values greater than one suggest a particular stock is more sensitive to changes in the market
(more volatile) and is a riskier investment (Brigham, 1989, p. 125). Therefore, stocks with beta
values greater than one have a positive relationship to cost of capital (Brigham, 1989, p. 419).
The finance literature supports the relationship between volatility and cost of equity
capital. For example, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) found a significant positive relationship
between volatility, measured using beta values, and cost of equity capital.
2.6.3 Degree of Leverage
Degree of leverage refers to the relative level of debt financing a company has
compared to equity (internal and external) financing. Degree of leverage impacts risk because
companies carrying high levels of debt are more likely to default and cease or curtail operations
than companies carrying lower levels of debt (Fama & French, 1992a). Degree of leverage is
positively related to cost of capital, and has commonly been measured using the debt to equity
ratio or a variation of the debt to equity ratio.
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Modigliani and Miller (1958) were the first to demonstrate that, assuming no taxes or
transaction costs, the weighted average cost of equity capital was higher as leverage increased.
Bhandari’s (1988) study of the relationship of leverage (measured by debt to equity ratio) to
cost of capital using data from 1948 to 1979 also found a positive relationship between
leverage and cost of equity capital. Fama and French (1992a), in their study of publicly traded
US firms from 1963 to 1989, measured leverage in two ways: market leverage (ratio of book
assets to market equity) and book leverage (ratio of book assets to book equity)5. They found,
consistent with Bhandari (1988), that higher market leverage resulted in higher equity capital
costs. However, they also found higher book leverage to be associated with lower equity
capital costs. They explained this inconsistency by noting that the difference between market
leverage and book leverage is the same as book to market equity6; therefore, book to market
equity must also capture the effect of leverage on cost of equity capital. Based on this insight,
Hail and Leuz (2006) used book to market equity as a measure of leverage, and found it to be
significant.
To summarize, the literature supports a positive relationship between leverage and cost
of equity capital.

5

A large ratio of book value of assets to book value of equity (BA/BE) indicates relatively lower debt financing. For
example, suppose a company’s assets have a book value of 80 and the book value of equity is 100. The ratio BA/BE
would be .8, or 80% (80/100), meaning 20% of assets were acquired through the issuance of debt.
The larger the ratio of the book value of assets relative to the market value of equity (BA/ME), the more market
value a company’s stock has lost. To continue with the previous example, suppose we have two companies whose
ratio of BA/BE is .8. Suppose the market value of Company One’s stock has increased to 120, while the market
value of Company Two’s stock has decreased to 90. The BV/ME ratio for Company One will be .67 (80/120), while
the ratio for Company Two will be .89 (80/90).
6
Fama and French (1992) actually compared the natural log of book equity/market equity to the difference
between the natural log of BA/BE and BA/ME.
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2.6.4 Industry
Industry refers to the industry group a firm belongs to. Industry impacts risk because
some industries are inherently riskier than others due to a variety of reasons such as
competitive environment, physical asset investment levels, changes in customer preferences,
reliance on non-owned resources, profitability, etc. (Conrad & Plotkin, 1968). Industry may
have either a positive or negative relationship with cost of equity capital, and is typically
measured by either the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system or the North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS).
Conrad and Plotkin (1968) developed a method of calculating relative risk by industry
based on deviations from average returns on investment by industry type for 59 U.S. industries
using SIC codes. Their work confirmed that different industries have different levels of risk.
Other work has confirmed that cost of equity capital differs between industries, presumably as
a result of differences in risk between industries. Fama and French (1997) compared estimated
cost of equity capital using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and their own 3-Factor
Model (3FM) for firms in 48 different industries. Although the purpose of their research was
not specifically designed to highlight differences in cost of equity capital between industries,
their results using either model clearly show differences in cost of equity capital between
industries. Gregory and Michou (2009) performed a similar analysis for 35 industries located in
Great Britain. They compared estimated cost of equity capital using four different models, and
found differences between industries regardless of the estimation method used.
To summarize, the finance literature recognizes that the industry a firm operates in
affects cost of equity capital either positively or negatively, depending upon the industry.
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2.7

Theoretical Perspectives of Cost of Equity Capital and Hypotheses Development
Sections 2.5 and 2.6 summarized risk factors related to cost of equity capital found in

the literature. These risk factors include information asymmetry (as measured by disclosure
levels), the political/regulatory environment (government stability and investor protection),
firm size, stock volatility, degree of leverage, and industry.
Cost of equity capital has been found to be negatively related to disclosure levels;
investor protection and enforcement; stable, relatively corruption free political environments;
and firm size. Cost of equity capital has been found to be positively related to stock volatility
and degree of leverage. Cost of equity capital has also been found to differ between industries.
Section 2.7 discusses the theoretical bases for this study, and develops the hypotheses
to be tested. Figure 1 presents the conceptual model. The remainder of this section follows
the structure of the model.
Cultural
difference
Country Level Risk Factors
 Information asymmetry
 Political/Regulatory
environment

H1 a-d

H2 a - d
H3 a - d

Firm/Industry Level Risk Factors
(Control Variables)
 Firm size
 Stock volatility
 Degree of leverage
 Industry

Figure 1. Factors Influencing the Cost of Equity Capital in Cross-listed Firms
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Cost of
Equity
Capital

2.7.1 Theoretical Foundations
2.7.1.1 Agency Theory
In their seminal work on corporate ownership theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976)
identified and discussed agency theory and associated agency costs. Agency theory refers to
situations in which absentee owners (outside shareholders) delegate decision-making authority
to managers. In such situations, there is a risk that managers may make decisions designed to
maximize their goals and desires rather than maximizing the goals and desires of shareholders.
The risk of this potential disconnect between managers’ desires and the outside shareholders’
desires leads to the incurrence of monitoring costs designed to provide some level of assurance
that the interests of the outside shareholders are being protected by managers. Monitoring
costs in publicly traded firms take several forms, including costs associated with directing
boards, audit committees, external audits, control systems, budget restrictions, and
management compensation plans. Although these expenditures may limit the degree to which
managers can use firm resources for personal gain, the risk cannot be completely eliminated.
As applied to the cost of equity capital, agency theory suggests that the price outside investors
are willing to pay for a company’s stock is negatively related to the degree of perceived risk
caused by goal incongruence between management and investors, which results in higher cost
of equity capital for the firm.
Although to my knowledge no studies link agency theory and cost of equity capital
directly, agency theory has been used to explain initial public offering (IPO) underpricing.
Underpricing describes the amount by which the price of an IPO is lower than the price of the
stock’s first trade on the secondary (investor to investor) market. Stock price is negatively
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related to cost of equity capital. Bedard et al. (2008) examined the monitoring role of audit
committees on IPO pricing for 246 Canadian firms . They hypothesized that firms with
independent and knowledgeable audit committees would be perceived by potential investors
as better monitors of management behavior. In turn, the improved monitoring was expected
to reduce IPO underpricing. They found, as hypothesized, that IPO underpricing was reduced
by approximately 8% for firms with strong audit committees. Similarly, Bruton et al. (2010)
examined the relationship between early-stage investor type (venture capitalists and business
angels), ownership concentrations and IPO underpricing in 224 matched firms located in France
and Great Britain. They found that firms in which early stage investors retained large blocks of
equity investment had lower levels of IPO underpricing. Their argument was that early-investor
retention signaled both faith in the firm’s prospects to outside investors and a shift from inside
objectives to shareholder objectives.
Attig et al. (2008) examined the ability of multiple large shareholders (MLS) to monitor
the largest single shareholder with respect to governance and information asymmetry
problems in over 1,000 firms located in eight eastern Asian and 13 western European countries.
The basic proposition was that the presence of MLS prevented the single largest shareholder
from abusing his/her voting power due to the threat of ultimate ownership and control that
could result through the collaboration of two or more MLSs. Attig et al. hypothesized that the
threat of loss of control was a form of monitoring that would improve governance and
information sharing, in turn resulting in a lower cost of equity capital. They found that the
presence, number, and control size of MLS were associated with lower cost of equity estimates,
thus supporting their hypothesis that MLS reduce agency problems through efficient
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monitoring. They also found that the type of MLS (state, financial institution, family) impacted
the perceived effectiveness of monitoring, with a large state ownership resulting in the lowest
cost of equity capital, and family ownership resulting in the highest cost of equity capital.
There is also research related to agency theory and firm performance. Firm
performance has a negative relationship with cost of equity capital. Profitable firms are
perceived as being less risky, which results in lower costs of equity capital. Dalton et al. (2003)
identified agency theory as the most widely used theory to explain relationships between
equity holdings and firm performance relationships. Dalton et al. performed a meta-analysis of
229 studies that examined the relationship between firm performance and the size and type of
stock ownership (managerial, institutional, and block). In Dalton et al.’s meta-analysis, the
generally hypothesized positive relationship between firm performance and ownership size and
type7 was in the correct direction, but was not significant. In spite of finding no significance
between type and size of ownership and firm performance, the authors acknowledged that
even small correlations are potentially important in terms of effect size on multi-billion dollar
firms. As a potential explanation for their results, they proposed a substitution hypothesis,
which they characterized as being similar to contingency theory. Essentially, the substitution
hypothesis suggests that management stock ownership is only one of several different
mechanisms available to align management and outside shareholder objectives, and that there

7

The literature in this area generally hypothesizes that management ownership of stock, institutional investors,
and the ownership of large voting blocks of stock by an individual or small group of investors has a positive
relationship with firm performance. In the case of management ownership, agency theory suggests this is a result
of better goal alignment between managers and stockholders; in the case of institutional investors and block
ownership, agency theory suggests these groups are better able to efficiently monitor and control management,
thus reducing the agency problem.
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may be interrelationships between ownership and other control mechanisms that influence
management actions and ultimately firm performance.
In summary, agency theory has been used to explain stock prices and firm performance,
both of which are related to cost of equity capital. However, agency theory does not
specifically address risks associated with cultural differences. Therefore, I use home bias and
cultural familiarity theory to explain the relationship between cultural differences and cost of
equity capital.
2.7.1.2 Home Bias Theory
The primary theories forming the basis for this research are home bias (Shiller, Kon-Ya,
& Tsutsui, 1996) and cultural familiarity (S.-H. Lee, Shenkar, & Li, 2008).
Home bias theory states that investors are consistently more optimistic about home
country stock performance and less optimistic about foreign country stock performance, which
results in overweighting portfolios with domestic stocks (French & Poterba, 1991). Although
the exact causes of home bias are still being debated, there are at least two primary and related
perspectives on the root causes of home bias: a competence effect and a proximity preference.
Graham, et al. (2009) used the term competence effect to describe how confident
investors are in their ability to make good investment decisions. Proximity preference refers to
stockholders’ preference to invest in companies that are perceived to be geographically or
culturally similar. This appears to be related to the competence effect in that investors believe
they are more competent in judging potential equity performance for firms that are either close
geographically or culturally similar.
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The existence of home bias on the structure of investment portfolios is well
documented in the literature. Babilis and Fitzgerald (2005) found that United Kingdom pension
fund managers exhibited high levels of home bias with respect to investments in emerging
market firms. They attributed this behavior to the Keynesian perspective that uncertainty is
related to investor beliefs, which in turn are attributable to factors other than calculated risks
and probabilities. Koval and Muskowitz (1999) examined U.S. domiciled investment choices of
1,189 U.S. fund managers in 1995. They found that fund managers demonstrated a significant
preference for investing in firms that were geographically proximate to manager’s location.
Another area of investor beliefs explored in the literature is perceived investor
competence. Kilka and Weber (2000) asked German and U.S. students in graduate level
investment courses to evaluate identical sets of German and U.S. stocks. They found persistent
evidence that students felt more competent to evaluate home country stocks than foreign
country stocks. This perception of competence then translated into more optimistic judgments
about expected performance for home country stocks. Graham et al. (2009) examined U.S.
investor behavior and perceived competence. Their sample consisted of USB/Gallup investor
survey data of U.S. households. Like Kilka and Weber, Graham et al. also found that perceived
investor competence had a negative relationship to home bias.
The existence of home bias on cross-listing decisions has also been documented.
Sarkissian and Schill (2004) studied the distribution of 2,251 cross-listings from 44 countries on
25 foreign exchanges. They found that firms, particularly those firms outside the G5 group of
industrialized countries, tended to list on markets that were geographically close. They also
found a preference for cross-listing into countries that were culturally and economically similar.
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Shiller et al. (1996) found mutual fund investors were less optimistic about the
performance of foreign stocks than about the performance of home country stocks. This effect
was mitigated by whether or not the foreign company had a physical presence in the host
country. Presumably, the physical presence of the company made it seem less foreign to
mutual fund managers. In a related area of research, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) found that
U.S. portfolio managers were heavily biased towards investments in locally headquartered
firms. They attributed this proximity preference to information asymmetries between locally
and non-locally headquartered firms. Similar results were subsequently found in Finnish
(Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001), Chinese (Lei & Seasholes, 2004), and Swedish (Massa & Simonov,
2006) investors. A contra-viewpoint to the proximity/information asymmetry perspective was
provided by Jeske (2001). In an examination of investment behavior in 11 industrialized
nations8, he demonstrated that information asymmetry and transaction/managing costs
between home and host countries were not sufficiently large to explain the discrepancy
between optimal and actual investment levels in home country firms compared to investment
levels in foreign firms, and concluded that there must also be a separate significant home bias
effect. However, he did not suggest alternative explanations for the degree of home bias he
found that could not be explained by information asymmetries and management cost.
The literature has also explored the relationship between home bias in investing
portfolios and cultural values. Anderson et al. (2011) examined 25,420 institutionally managed
portfolios in more than 60 countries in 2006. Their measure of home bias was the
concentration of home country stocks in the portfolio. Using both Hofstede and GLOBE
8

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
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measures, they found that uncertainty avoidance and individualism were positively related to
home bias, while high levels of assertiveness, collectivism, and masculinity were negatively
related to home bias.
To summarize, home bias is a phenomenon that has been well documented in the
literature. However, root causes of home bias are still being debated. Extending home bias
theory to cross-listing, perceived risk among investors in the host country should be greater for
cross-listing firms, resulting in higher cost of equity capital. Cultural difference may contribute
to the incidence of home bias by exacerbating problems related to perceived investor
competence. This leads into the second theoretical foundation for this study: cultural
familiarity theory.
2.7.1.3 Cultural Familiarity Theory
Cultural familiarity theory states that firms prefer not to invest in culturally different
countries, and that when they do, their performance suffers. (S.-H. Lee et al., 2008) Lee et al.
used cultural familiarity theory to explain foreign direct investment decisions and the preferred
level of control over those investments. They examined the impact of national culture and
direction of joint venture investment (inward vs. outward)9 on level of control in 444 small and
medium sized South Korean firms. They found firms seeking inward investment preferred
having greater control, presumably because they were more comfortable in their home
environment. They also found that the direction of investment moderated the impact of
cultural difference on level of control. As cultural difference increased, firms seeking inward9

Inward joint venture refers to a firm looking for a foreign partner to come into the firm’s domestic environment.
Outward joint venture refers to a firm looking for a foreign partner to extend the firm’s reach into a foreign
environment. In the case of inward investment, the originating firm only deals with the foreignness of the partner;
in the case of outward investment, the originating firm deals with both a foreign partner and a foreign business
environment.
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bound investments required lower levels of control, and firms seeking outward-bound
investments required higher levels of control.
Cultural familiarity also has an impact on the level of satisfaction with foreign partners.
Lee et al. (2007) surveyed 201 U.S. purchasing managers who dealt directly with foreign export
partners. They found that cultural familiarity moderated purchase managers’ satisfaction with
the foreign exchange partner on the managers’ interest in the success of the foreign exchange
partner. Specifically, if the purchase manager felt a high level of cultural familiarity with the
exchange partner, they were also more interested in the success of the exchange partner.
Extending cultural familiarity theory to cross-listing, investors should prefer to invest in
companies based in countries considered to be culturally similar to the host country. A higher
rate of return will be required to entice investors to invest in companies based in culturally
different countries. Furthermore, since cultural familiarity theory is related to differences in
political and legal systems, cultural differences may impact the degree of the effect of
information asymmetry, the legal environment, and the political environment on the cost of
equity capital.
Together, home bias theory and cultural differences theory offer an explanation for why
the cost of equity capital for cross-listed firms will be influenced by cultural distance. In
particular, higher cost of equity capital will be expected for larger cultural differences. This
leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: The greater the overall cultural difference between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed, the higher the cost of equity
capital.
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In aggregate, larger cultural differences may increase cost of equity capital. However,
overall cultural difference may be too broad to be useful from both research and practitioner
perspectives. In fact, it is possible that different cultural dimensions actually have different
effects on perceived risk, and thus on cost of equity capital. Kim and Gray (2009) suggest that
potentially useful information concerning cultural differences may be lost through the process
of scale aggregation. They recommend disaggregating the scales to provide a better
understanding of which cultural dimensions are important in cultural research. For this reason,
it is useful to determine which cultural dimensions are a related to, and how they affect, the
cost of equity capital.
The effect of cultural difference on cost of equity capital has not been examined in the
literature. Although it would be interesting to include all of the GLOBE cultural dimensions in
this study, this initial examination of direct and indirect effects of cultural difference on
variables impacting cost of equity capital is exploratory and uses only a limited number of
GLOBE cultural dimensions. The dimensions chosen for this study are those which, based on
the literature review, are likely to impact cost of equity capital. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is
further refined in terms of specific cultural dimensions.
The literature has consistently found that Hofstede’s dimensions of individualism,
uncertainty avoidance, and power distance are related to factors affecting cost of equity
capital. Therefore, the GLOBE dimensions most closely approximating individualism,
uncertainty avoidance, and power distance were selected for this study. These dimensions are,
in GLOBE terminology, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, uncertainty avoidance,
and power distance. For each dimension, GLOBE measures capture perceptions about practice
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(what is) as well as values (what should be). This study focuses exclusively on the practice
aspect of each dimension, because I am interested in how things are rather than how they
should be.
House et al. (2004) examined relationships between each of their cultural dimensions
on several societal conditions. Three of these societal conditions are particularly relevant to
cost of equity capital – economic prosperity, rate of savings, and favorable attitudes toward
democratic government. Higher levels of economic prosperity and savings rates suggest
greater liquidity (more funds available for investment), which in turn has been found to be
related to lower costs of equity capital. Favorable attitudes towards democratic government
suggest a preference for private ownership of business and a decreased risk of government
appropriation, which reduces risk to investors. Reduced risk is also related to lower cost of
equity capital. Ceteris paribus, firms domiciled in countries that have democratic forms of
government, are economically prosperous, and save more should have access to greater
amounts of equity capital at a relatively low cost. This relationship is not likely to hold for firms
cross-listing on exchanges outside their home countries. As explained above, both home bias
theory and cultural familiarity theory suggest that cultural difference, measured by cultural
distance, is an additional risk factor that has the effect of increasing cost of equity capital for
cross-listing firms.

Institutional Collectivism
Institutional collectivism refers to practices that emphasize and reward collective
actions versus individual actions and achievements. Societies high on institutional collectivism
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also tend to be future and performance oriented. House et al. (2004) found that societies high
on institutional collectivism practices tend to have higher levels of economic prosperity. The
relatively higher levels of economic prosperity found by House et al. may be the result of the
ability of employees to pull together towards a common goal – economic success. As
previously discussed, economic prosperity suggests greater liquidity, which in turn is related to
lower cost of equity capital.
Societies low on institutional collectivism tend to exhibit more individualistic
characteristics, including a desire to achieve short-term goals and to take calculated risks, which
can also lead to economic success, at least for short to mid-term time frames (Andy C.W. Chui
et al., 2010). Since both high and low institutional collectivism have the potential for realizing
economic success, albeit from different perspectives and methods, greater differences on
institutional collectivism practices may reasonably be expected to reduce cost of equity capital.
Therefore:
H1a: The greater the cultural distance on institutional collectivism practices between a
firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed, the
lower the cost of equity capital.
In-Group Collectivism
In-group collectivism refers to the extent to which individuals identify with and are loyal
to familial and work groups. Countries high on in-group collectivism tend to defer to authority
and subsume personal goals in favor of group goals. House et al. (2004) found that that
societies high on in-group collectivism tend to be more passive, and tend to have lower levels
of economic prosperity. This may partially explain the tendency for societies high on in-group
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collectivism to form close knit extended family groups, which may be a way of pooling
resources for the well-being of the group. Regardless of cause, the low per-capita gross
national product suggests that firms operating in this environment are more likely to fail, which
increases risk and results in higher costs of equity capital. As cultural distance on in-group
collectivism practices increases, perceived risk of poor economic performance increases, and
consistent with both home bias and cultural familiarity theories, perceived risk increases.
Therefore:
H1b: The greater the cultural distance on in-group collectivism practices between a
firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed, the
higher the cost of equity capital.
Uncertainty Avoidance
Societies high on uncertainty avoidance value structure and predictability, and prefer to
avoid risk to the extent possible. House et al. (2004) found that societies high on uncertainty
avoidance practices have higher levels of economic prosperity and more positive attitudes
toward democratic government. They suggest this is a result of government and societal
support for economic development and growth, which on the surface would appear to
decrease risk. However, greater uncertainty avoidance distance reduces the perceived
predictability of outcomes, and results in greater perceived risk. Therefore:
H1c: The greater the cultural distance on uncertainty avoidance practices between a
firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed, the
higher the cost of equity capital.
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Power Distance
Power distance refers to how members of society expect and accept status differences.
House et al. (2004) found that societies high on power distance practices tend to have lower
levels of economic prosperity. Their explanation is that those in power tend to use that power
for their own self-interests, which impacts business in two ways. First, individuals without
power in high power distance societies may be prevented from improving their situation in life.
This provides firms with less competent people to employ, which limits opportunities for
growth and adaptation. Second, firms may be used by those in power to meet their own needs,
which undermines the ability of firms to make positive changes in order to react to changes in
the environment. This combination eventually leads to deterioration and failure of the firm, and
ultimately affects the economic health of society. In high power distance societies there is a
combination of poor economic performance and unchecked individual power for the elite,
which imply greater risk and higher costs of equity capital. Therefore:
H1d: The greater the cultural distance on power distance practices between a firm’s
home country and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed, the
higher the cost of equity capital.
Cultural Distance as a Moderator
The literature has identified several additional risks that affect cost of capital, including
industry, leverage, size, stock volatility (beta), the political/regulatory environment (Guler &
Guillen, 2010; Hail & Leuz, 2006; La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1998); and information
asymmetry (Francis et al., 2005; Hail & Leuz, 2006). Although each of these factors may be
influenced by national culture in some way, industry, leverage, size, and volatility are either
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firm or industry specific, and are therefore less likely to be affected by cultural differences.
There is evidence that information asymmetry and the political/regulatory environment are
affected by cultural differences. Continuing with home bias and cultural familiarity theories,
investors in one country are likely to mistrust foreign political and regulatory environments,
which may in turn affect their perception of the strength of the economic environment.
Investors are also likely to have reservations about the quality of information provided by firms
located in other countries. Therefore, cultural difference should moderate the effect of the
political/regulatory environment and information asymmetry on cost of equity capital. In other
words, large cultural differences are likely to exacerbate the negative effects of the
political/regulatory environment and information asymmetry. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
H2a: The institutional collectivism distance between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of the
political/regulatory environment on the cost of equity capital.
H2b: The in-group collectivism distance between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of the
political/regulatory environment on the cost of equity capital.
H2c: The uncertainty avoidance distance between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of the
political/regulatory environment on the cost of equity capital.

43

H2d: The power distance between a firm’s home country and the foreign exchange
where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of the political/regulatory
environment on the cost of equity capital.
H3a: The institutional collectivism distance between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of
information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
H3b: The in-group collectivism distance between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of
information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
H3c: The uncertainty avoidance distance between a firm’s home country and the
foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of
information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
H3d: The power distance between a firm’s home country and the foreign exchange
where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of information asymmetry
on the cost of equity capital.
Chapter 3 discusses the samples, variables, and measures used to test these
hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Sample Selection
Firm data was obtained from Capital IQ and Compustat, both proprietary databases
owned by Standard & Poor. The initial screening identified more than 9,000 firms that listed
stocks on two exchanges in 2006. 2006 was chosen because it is the year prior to the beginning
of the latest U.S. recession in 2007 (NBER, 2008) and the subsequent decline in global markets.
The second screening identified and eliminated firms that listed on two different exchanges
within the same country, firms that did not list on an exchange in the country where the firm’s
headquarters were located, and firms trading on exchanges that were not members of the
World Federation of Exchanges (WFE). Firms listing on two exchanges within the same country
were eliminated because there is no country level cultural distance for these firms. Firms not
listing on an exchange in their headquarters country were eliminated because the cultural
distance measure is complicated by the introduction of a third country – the headquarters
country and two foreign country exchanges —for firms that are headquartered in one country
(the home country) but list exclusively on exchanges outside the home country. Because this is
a preliminary study to examine whether or not cultural distance affects cost of equity capital in
cross-listed firms, I felt it best to keep the cultural distance measurement as straightforward as
possible. The third filter, WFE membership, was used to minimize the inclusion of equities that
are not necessarily subject to the same regulatory environment as those trading on fullmember exchanges, such as over-the-counter offerings. After the second screening, 4,930
firms remained. Due to missing data in Capital IQ, the third screening extracted financial data
from Compustat NA by matching CIK codes available in Capital IQ to CIK codes in Compustat
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NA. After the fourth screening, 3,780 firms remained. The fourth and final screening identified
those firms for which all four measures of the variable of interest, cost of equity capital, could
be calculated. The final sample resulted in 1,243 firms, representing 8 home countries, 4 host
countries, 11 exchanges, and 63 industries. Table 2 summarizes the sample detail.
Table 2. Sample

Home Country
Country
Argentina

Industries
Number of
Firms
1

Category

South Korea

1

0100 – 0900: Agriculture, Forestry &
Fishing
1000 – 1400: Mining
1520 – 1731: Construction
2000 – 3990: Manufacturing
4011 – 4991: Transportation,
Communication, Electric, Gas &
Sanitary Services
5000 – 5190: Wholesale Trade

Taiwan

2

5200 – 5990: Retail Trade

Canada
France
Israel
Mexico

United States

20
1
2
2

1214

Host Country
Country
Canada
Germany
Israel
United States

Number of
Firms
1
1230

6000 – 6799: Financial, Insurance &
Real Estate
7000 – 8900: Services
9995: Non-operating Establishments

1
11
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Number of
Firms
2
71
15
554
128

28
42
195
206
2

3.2

Measures and Variables

3.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest in this study is cost of equity capital. Four measures
of cost of equity capital are used to evaluate the robustness of the results. Each measure is
discussed in the following sections.
3.2.1.1 Return on Common Equity
The most basic measure of cost of equity is the Return on Equity (ROE) ratio. Although
several variations of ROE exist, in this study, a modified version of Return on Common Equity
(ROCE) has been selected to measure ROE. The rationale behind this choice is that the resulting
formula for ROE more accurately measures ordinary return on common stockholders’ equity
(Clayman, Fridson, & Troughton, 2008). ROCE is calculated as follows:
ROCE = (NI – unusual items – preferred dividends)/Average CS Equity
Where:
NI = accounting net income;
Unusual items = gains and losses from extraordinary items, discontinued
operations, and accounting changes;
Average CS equity = simple average of the sum of book value of common shares
and retained earnings.
3.2.1.2 Global Capital Asset Pricing Model
The second measure of cost of equity capital used in this study is the Global Capital
Asset Pricing Model (GCAPM) proposed by Stulz (1999). Stulz argues that for international
firms, a capital asset pricing model based on global returns is a better measure of cost of equity
capital. Therefore, GCAPM uses a global market return and a firm global beta to calculate cost
of equity capital.
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GCAPM is calculated as follows:
Ke = Rf + [βg * (Rg-Rf)]
Where:
Ke = cost of equity capital
Rf = home country risk free rate
βg = firm global beta
Rg = expected global return on equity
The home country risk free rate (Rf) is proxied by country specific long-term debt
rates. The expected global return on equity (Rg) is proxied by the MSCI Global
World Index return, as suggested by Stulz (1999). The company’s global beta (βg)
is calculated using the market model method (Clayman et al., 2008).
The market model method of calculating β is based on the following regression:
Rit = a + β*Rmkt
Where:
Rit = firm’s stock return
a = regression constant
β = beta coefficient (the slope of regression equation)
Rmkt = (global) market return
Rit is proxied by monthly firm stock returns reported in Capital IQ for the three year period from
January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2006. Rmkt is proxied by monthly returns on the MCSI
World Index.
3.2.1.3 Ohlson-Juettner Model
The third measure of cost of capital used in this study is based on Gode and
Mohanram’s (2003)operationalization of Ohlson-Juettner’s (OJ) model of calculating cost of
equity capital. Among the advantages of the OJ model, according to Gode and Mohanram, are
that the model works with earnings rather than dividends, and so circumvents problems
associated with dividend growth models; there is no need for explicit assumptions about
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payout policies or clean surplus; and the model is parsimonious. The OJ model, as
operationalized by Gode and Mohanran, appears below:
Re = A + sqrt [A2 + ((eps1/P0)*(g2- (-1)]
Where:
Re = cost of equity
A = 1/2 *((( (dps1)/P0))
dps1 = dividend per share, time 1
P0 = stock price, time zero
g2 = (eps2 - eps1)/eps1
eps1 = earnings per share, time 1
eps2 = earnings per share, time 2
-1 = rf - 3%
Rf = yield on country 10-year treasury bonds
The yield on country 10-year treasury bonds (Rf) is proxied by the 10-year foreign government
debt rate.
3.2.1.4 Price Earning Growth Model
The fourth and final cost of equity model that used in this study is Easton’s (2004)
modified Price/Earnings Growth (PEG) model. According to Easton, the PEG model
incorporates both earnings and growth, which is consistent with current practice by analysts.
The PEG model appears below:
Re = sqrt[(eps2 +dps1 – eps1)/P0]
Where:
Re = cost of common equity
eps1 = earnings per share, time 1
eps2 = earnings per share, time 2
dps1 = dividend per share, time 1
P0 = Price per share, time 0
3.2.2 Independent Variables
3.2.2.1 Cultural Distance
Cultural difference is operationalized by cultural distance. Cultural distance is a
quantitative measure of cultural difference, based on numeric differences derived from cultural
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dimension scales, such as Hofstede (1980, 2001) and GLOBE (House et al., 2004). Cross-listing
firms are subject to the same firm/industry level and country level risk factors as firms that do
not cross-list. These factors were summarized in the literature review. The premise of this
paper is that cross-listing firms are also subject to an additional risk, cultural distance. This
additional risk is expected to impact the cost of equity capital in cross-listing firms.
Cultural distance is based on cultural dimensions identified in the GLOBE study (House
et al., 2004). For each cultural dimension chosen for this study, individual dimension cultural
distance is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the headquarter country
GLOBE score and the host country GLOBE score (Sivakumar & Nakata, 2001). An aggregate
cultural distance measure was calculated by calculating the average of the absolute value of the
cultural distances for the four cultural dimensions selected.
3.2.2.2 Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry is measured using Frost et al.’s (2006) overall stock exchange
disclosure scores. Frost et al.’s measures are similar to the disclosure requirement index used
by Hail and Leuz (2006). The disclosure required by the stock exchange is more relevant for
determining information asymmetry between countries because the exchange determines the
amount and format of information presented to investors for stocks listed on that exchange.
Frost el al.’s (2006)disclosure scores are calculated as the mean of the standardized
measure of five components: enforcement actions, dissemination of rules and enforcement,
adoption of stronger disclosure rules, increased in rigor of enforcement, and changes in
information dissemination systems.
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Information asymmetry differences are calculated as the absolute difference between
stock exchange disclosure scores. This is consistent with the method used to calculate the
individual cultural distance values.
3.2.2.3 Regulatory and Political Environment
The regulatory and political environments are measured using the composite political risk
scores found in the International Country Risk Guide, Researchers’ Dataset 3B, developed by
PRS Group Inc. IRCG political risk scores are very highly correlated with future equity returns10
and equity valuation measures (Erb, Harvey, & Viskanta, 1996). Also, the law and order
subcomponent of the IRCG political risk score was used by La Porta et al. (1997) to study the
relationship between the legal environment and capital markets. The composite political risk
score consists of 12 weighted components: government stability, socioeconomic conditions,
investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious
tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.
These components are summarized in Table 3. Due to the proprietary nature of the ICRG risk
scores, exact information about items measured is not publicly available. Component scores
are based on the subjective analysis of available information, and converted to risk points using
a consistent evaluation pattern. The component scores are then summed to arrive at the
overall political risk score. Higher scores represent greater political stability. A score of 49 or
below indicates very high risk, 50 to 59 indicates high risk, 60 to 69 indicates moderate risk, 70
to 79 indicates low risk, and 80 or above indicates very low risk.

10

This paper examines the cost of equity from the firm’s perspective. Equity returns would be the investor’s
perspectives. Both refer to the cost of equity capital.
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Table 3. Political Risk Components
Component

Description

Government
Stability

The ability of the government’s ability to
carry out programs and stay in power.

Socioeconomic
Conditions

An assessment of socioeconomic pressures
that may inhibit government action or
increase social dissatisfaction.

Investment
Profile

Factors affecting investment risk that are
not covered in other components.

Internal Conflict

An assessment of violence within a country
that may affect governance.

External Conflict

An assessment of the risk (both violent and
non-violent) to an existing government
from other countries.

Corruption

An assessment of corruption in the political
system. Examples of characteristics
assessed include bribes, nepotism, job
reservation, favors for favors, secret
funding, excessively close ties between
politicians and business.
The extent of military involvement in
government. Examples of characteristics
assessed include the presence of military
regimes, threat of military takeover, and
length of military rule.
An evaluation of the extent of religious
tension and religious influence on
governance. Examples of characteristics
assessed include dominance of a single
religious party in governance, suppression
of religious freedom, and desire of a
religious group to become a separate
entity.

Military in
Politics

Religious
Tensions
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Subcomponents
Government
Unity
Legislative
Strength
Popular Support
Unemployment
Consumer
Confidence
Poverty
Contract
Viability/Exprop
riation
Profits
Repatriation
Payment Delays
Civil War/Coup
Threats
Terrorism/Politi
cal Violence
Civil Disorder
War
Cross-Border
Conflict
Foreign
Pressures
None identified.

Point
Value
12

None identified.

6

None identified.

6

12

12

12

12

6

Table 3 (Continued). Political Risk Components
Component

Description

Law and Order

An assessment of the strength and
impartiality of the legal system and the
degree to which citizens obey laws.
Examples of characteristics assessed
include strength/impartiality of the legal
system,
civil obedience to laws, and crime rate
Degree of tension in a country due to
nationality, race, or language issues.
Examples of characteristics assessed
include between group level of racial
tension and level of national identity
tension.
An evaluation of the responsiveness of
government to its people.
Governments are classified into one of five
types (ranked from least risky to most
risky): alternating democracies, dominated
democracies, de-facto one-party states,
de-jure one-party states, autarchies.

Ethnic Tensions

Democratic
Accountability

Bureaucracy
Quality

The strength and quality of governmental
bureaucracy.

Subcomponents
None identified.

Point
Value
6

None identified.

6

None identified.

6

None identified.

4

Examples of characteristics assessed
include continuity of established
administrative functions and services
during changes in governments and the
presence of established mechanisms for
recruiting and training.
Total points
possible

100

The difference in political risk is measured as the absolute difference of the composite
political risk score between the headquarter country and the host country. This is consistent
with the measure of cultural distance used in this study.
3.2.3 Control Variables
Firm size is measured using market value of equity (Fama & French, 1992, 1993).
Industry is identified by the four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Stock
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volatility is measured using firms’ beta for the three year period from 2004 through 2006
(Brigham, 1989, p. 123). Degree of leverage is measured by the debt to equity ratio (Botosan &
Plumlee, 2002). Table 4 summarizes the measures used in this study.
Table 4. Summary of Variables
Variables
Dependent Variable
Cost of Equity Capital

Independent Variables
Cultural Distance

Political/Regulatory Risk

Disclosure

Control Variables
Size
Industry
Stock Volatility
Degree of Leverage

Measure

Source

Return on Common Equity
Global Capital Asset Pricing
Model (GCAPM)
Ohlson-Juettner Model
(OJ)
Price Earnings Growth
Model (PEG)

Clayman et al., 2008
Stultz, 1999

Difference between HQ
and Host countries based
on the
GLOBE Cultural
Dimensions of:
Institutional Collectivism
(Instit)
In-group Collectivism
(Ingrp)
Uncertainty Avoidance
(UA)
Power Distance (PD)
Difference between HQ
country and Host country
ICRG political risk scores.
Difference between HQ
country exchange
disclosure score and Host
country exchange
disclosure score.

Sivakumar and Nakata,
2001

Market value of equity
4-digit SIC codes
3 year stock beta
Debt to equity ratio

Fama & French, 1992
Conrad & Plotkin, 1968
Brigham, 1999
Plumlee & Botosan, 2002
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Gode and Mohanram,
2003
Easton, 2004

Erb et al., 1998

Frost et al., 2006

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Table 5 reports means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables in this
study. All values in Table 5 are untransformed and uncentered. I evaluated the presence of
multicollinearity. An examination of the correlation magnitudes and the results of the
regression diagnostics indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem. All VIFs are below the
recommended maximum value of 10 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006, p. 230).
There are two pairs of variables that are highly correlated. First, there is a high correlation
between GCAPM and beta (-0.994). This correlation is expected because beta is part of the
GCAPM calculation. For this reason, beta is not included as a control variable in regressions
where GCAPM is the dependent variable. Second, there is a high correlation between two of
the cost of equity capital variables, OJ and PEG (0.999). The high correlation reflects the fact
that OJ and PEG measure the underlying construct, cost of equity capital, in similar ways. This
is not a concern in this study because the dependent variables are not included together in any
model.
I evaluated for the presence of outliers. Potential outliers were identified and
evaluated. No cases appear to unduly influence the results of the analyses (Cook’s distances <
1; absolute values of DfBeta < 1) (Field, 2009, p. 245). All errors appear to be independent
(Durbin-Watson scores approximately 1.8 to 1.9 for all models; no scores were less than 1 or
greater than 3 (Field, 2009, p. 785).
To test the hypotheses presented in this paper, separate regressions were estimated for
each cultural dimension and each different cost of equity capital variable. In each analysis,
Model 1 includes the control variables and the main effect of cultural distance. Model 2, in
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Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations.
Variable
Mean
s.d.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
1. ROCE
0.063
2.090 1.000
2. GCAPM
0.042
0.033 0.112 ** 1.000
3. OJ
1.018
0.065 0.160 ** -0.083 ** 1.000
4. PEG
1.009
0.064 0.162 ** -0.083 ** 0.999 ** 1.000
5. CD-Institut
0.411
0.039 -0.004
-0.039
-0.040
-0.025
1.000
6. CD - Ingroup
0.235
0.086 0.002
-0.026
0.034
0.043
0.331 ** 1.000
7. CD - UA
1.056
0.095 0.004
0.061 * 0.023
0.020
0.129 ** -0.376 ** 1.000
8. CD - PD
0.368
0.033 -0.003
0.040
-0.037
-0.037
0.563 ** 0.046
0.372 ** 1.000
9. PolRisk
5.194
0.873 0.006
0.025
0.061 * 0.057 * -0.373 ** 0.310 ** -0.085 ** -0.370 ** 1.000
10. Frost Score
1.167
0.489 -0.051
-0.070 * -0.085 ** -0.084 ** 0.087 ** -0.024
0.099 ** 0.060 * -0.071 * 1.000
11. MCap
2934.7 5721.3 0.038
0.133 ** 0.028
0.030
0.034
0.000
0.046
0.051
-0.003 -0.226 ** 1.000
12. SIC
4657.4 1980.1 0.074 ** -0.029
0.085 ** 0.084 ** -0.075 ** 0.020
0.023
-0.056 * 0.088 ** 0.022
0.031
1.000
13. Beta
0.153
0.905 -0.112 ** -0.994 ** 0.082 ** 0.080 ** -0.020
-0.016
-0.063 * -0.043
-0.024
0.067 * -0.134 ** 0.025
1.000
14. D:E
1.670
5.523 -0.050 + 0.016
0.003
0.005
0.031
0.019
-0.004
0.026
-0.006 -0.070 * 0.113 ** 0.094 ** -0.018
1.000
n = 1243
** p <.01 (2-tailed); * p<.05 (2-tailed)
ROCE = Return on Common Equity; GCAPM = Global Capital Asset Pricing Model; OJ = Ohlson-Juettner Model; PEG = Price-Earnings-Growth Model; CD = Cultural Distance, measured
as the absolute value of the difference between the cultural distance score in the headquarter country and the host country. Institut = Institutional Collectivism; Ingroup = Ingroup Collectivism;
UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; PD = Power Distance; PolRisk = Political/Regulatory Environment distance, measured as the absolute value of the difference between the political risk score
in the headquarter country and the host country. Frost Score = Disclosure distance, measured as the absolute value of the difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure score in
the headquarter country and the host country. MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification.
Beta = 3-year average company beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio.
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addition to the control variables and main effect of cultural distance, includes the interaction
between the political/regulatory distance variable and the cultural distance variable. Model 3,
in addition to the control variables and main effect, includes the interaction between the
disclosure distance variable and the cultural distance variable. Model 4 includes all control
variables, the main effect, and both interactions. Analyses including more than one cultural
distance variable in the models were also performed, and are discussed in the sensitivity
analysis section. The results are summarized in Table 6 and discussed in the following sections.
4.1

Institutional Collectivism

4.1.1 Main Effects
Hypothesis 1a predicts a negative relationship between institutional collectivism
distance (CD – Institutional) and cost of equity capital. The hypothesized relationship was
tested in Model 1, which included only the influence of institutional collectivism on cost of
equity capital. The hypothesized relationship was also tested in Models 2 through 4, which
included the main effect of cultural distance and interactions. The regression results for
institutional collectivism appear in Table 7. Panel A presents the results for cost of equity
capital measured by GCAPM, panel B presents the results as measured by OJ, and panel C
presents the results as measured by PEG. The regressions for cost of equity capital measured
by ROCE are displayed in Appendix B because no significant results for the variables under study
were found.
In Model 1, the relationship between institutional collectivism distance (CDInstitutional) and cost of equity capital is not significant when measured by GCAPM, OJ, or PEG.
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Table 6. Summary of Results
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a

Hypothesis 1b

Hypothesis 1c

Hypothesis 1d

Hypothesis 2a

Hypothesis 2b

Hypothesis 2c

Hypothesis 2d

Hypothesis 3a

Hypothesis 3b

Hypothesis 3c

Hypothesis 3d

The greater the cultural distance on institutional collectivism practices
between a firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the
firm’s stock is cross-listed, the lower the cost of equity capital.
The greater the cultural distance on in-group collectivism practices
between a firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the
firm’s stock is cross-listed, the higher the cost of equity capital.
The greater the cultural distance on uncertainty avoidance practices
between a firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the
firm’s stock is cross-listed, the higher the cost of equity capital.
The greater the cultural distance on power distance practices between
a firm’s home country and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock
is cross-listed, the higher the cost of equity capital.
The institutional collectivism distance between a firm’s home country
and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed
moderates the impact of the political/regulatory environment on the
cost of equity capital.
The in-group collectivism distance between a firm’s home country and
the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates
the impact of the political/regulatory environment on the cost of equity
capital.
The uncertainty avoidance distance between a firm’s home country and
the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates
the impact of the political/regulatory environment on the cost of equity
capital.
The power distance between a firm’s home country and the foreign
exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of
the political/regulatory environment on the cost of equity capital.
The institutional collectivism distance between a firm’s home country
and the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed
moderates the impact of information asymmetry on the cost of equity
capital.
The in-group collectivism distance between a firm’s home country and
the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates
the impact of information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
The uncertainty avoidance distance between a firm’s home country and
the foreign exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates
the impact of information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
The power distance between a firm’s home country and the foreign
exchange where the firm’s stock is cross-listed moderates the impact of
information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital.
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Predicted
Direction

Supported

-

No

+

No

+

Yes

+

No

+/-

Yes

+/-

Yes

+/-

Yes

+/-

No

+/-

Yes

+/-

No

+/-

No

+/-

No

The cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM is in the predicted direction and marginally
significant (p<.10, Panel A, Model 3 and 4) when the interaction between institutional
collectivism and disclosure (FrostScore) is added (Models 3 and 4). The cost of equity capital
measured by OJ is marginally significant (p<.10, Panel B, Model 2) when the interaction
between institutional collectivism and political/regulatory distance (PolRisk) is added, but is not
in the predicted direction. Based on these results, hypothesis 1a, which predicts a direct effect
between institutional collectivism and the cost of equity capital, is not supported.
4.1.2 Interaction between the Political/Regulatory Environment and Institutional
Collectivism
Hypothesis 2a predicts that institutional collectivism distance will moderate the effect of
the political/regulatory environment distance (PolRisk) on cost of equity capital. The
interaction between institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory distance is
positive but not significant when cost of equity capital is measured by GCAPM (Panel A, Model
2). The interaction is positive and marginally significant when cost of equity capital is measured
by OJ (p<.10, Panel B, Model 2) and significant when cost of equity capital is measured by PEG
(p<.05, Panel C, Model 2). These relationships are shown graphically in Figures 2 and 3. These
interactions indicate that, when political/regulatory distance is low, the cost of equity capital,
measured by both OJ and PEG, is lower when institutional collectivism distance is high rather
than low. When the political/regulatory environment distance is high, cost of equity capital is
about the same when measured using PEG regardless of institutional collectivism distance.
The pattern is similar when cost of equity capital is measured using OJ, although when the
political/regulatory environment distance is large, cost of equity capital is lower when
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institutional collectivism distance is low than it is high. Based on these results, hypothesis 2a,
which predicts a moderating effect of institutional collectivism on the relationship between the
political/regulatory environment and the cost of capital, is supported.
4.1.3 Interaction between Disclosure and Institutional Collectivism
Hypothesis 3a predicts that institutional collectivism distance will moderate the effect of
the disclosure distance (FrostScore) on the cost of equity capital. When measured by GCAPM,
the interaction between institutional collectivism and disclosure requirements is negative and
significant (p<.05, Panel A, Model 3). However, the interaction is not significant for other
measures of cost of equity capital in this study. The interaction is shown graphically in Figure 4.
The interaction indicates that when disclosure distance is low, the cost of equity capital,
measured by GCAPM, is approximately the same regardless of the level of institutional
collectivism distance. When disclosure distance is high, the cost of equity capital is higher when
institutional collectivism distance is low that when it is high. Based on these results, hypothesis
3a, which predicts a moderating effect of institutional collectivism on the relationship between
the disclosure environment and cost of equity capital, is supported. .
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Table 7. OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Institutional Collectivism
Panel A: Global Capital Asset Pricing Model (GCAPM)

Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Institutional

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

0.127 ***
(4.361)
-0.037
(-1.284)
0.004
(0.151)
0.012
(0.391)
-0.036
(-1.238)

0.127 ***
(4.354)
-0.037
(-1.281)
0.004
(0.151)
0.012
(0.391)
-0.036
(-1.237)

0.122 ***
(4.201)
-0.039
(-1.379)
0.003
(0.094)
0.019
(0.634)
-0.041
(-1.404)

0.123 ***
(4.209)
-0.038
(-1.340)
0.003
(0.095)
0.018
(0.598)
-0.040
(-1.386)

-0.039
(-1.268)

-0.039
(-1.263)

-0.055 +
(-1.734)

-0.056 +
(-1.775)

Interactions
CD-Institutional xPolRisk

0.001
(0.023)

CD-Institutional x
FrostScore

R2
Adjusted R2
F

-0.013
(-0.449)
-0.060 *
(-1.996)

0.022
0.018
4.703 ***

0.022
0.017
4.028 ***

0.025
0.020
4.610 ***

-0.063 *
(-2.046)
0.026
0.019
4.056 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC = 4digit standard industrial classification. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory
environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for
the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure requirement distance measured as
the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction
term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CDInstitutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the
exchange disclosure score distance.

61

Table 7 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Institutional Collectivism
Panel B: Ohlson-Juettner Model (OJ)
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Control Variables
Mcap
0.020
0.018
0.020
0.018
(0.671)
(0.605)
(0.665)
(0.629)
SIC
0.080 **
0.076 **
0.080 **
0.076 **
(2.823)
(2.654)
(2.816)
(2.664)
Beta
0.089 **
0.091 ***
0.089 **
0.091 ***
(3.140)
(3.218)
(3.138)
(3.202)
D:E
-0.011
-0.011
-0.011
-0.011
(-0.372)
(-0.386)
(-0.374)
(-0.375)
PolRisk
0.047
0.053 +
0.047
0.051 +
(1.534)
(1.723)
(1.528)
(1.673)
FrostScore
-0.085 **
-0.088 **
-0.085 **
-0.087 **
(-2.924)
(-3.032)
(-2.917)
(-2.993)
Main Effects
CD - Institutional
-0.008
-0.004
-0.009
0.056 +
(-0.268)
(-0.148)
(-0.272)
(1.927)
Interactions
CD-Institutional x PolRisk
0.054 +
0.056 +
(1.888)
(1.927)
CD-Institutional x FrostScore
-0.002
0.012
(-0.050)
(0.393)
2

R
2
Adjusted R
F

0.025
0.020
4.530 ***

0.028
0.022
4.417 ***

0.025
0.019
3.961 ***

0.028
0.021
3.941 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock.
SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as
the 3 year average monthly beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the
political/regulatory environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between the
ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure
requirement distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange
disclosure scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of
the difference between the GLOBE institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism
distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore =
the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score
distance.
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Table 7 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Institutional Collectivism
Panel C: Price-Earnings-Growth Model (PEG)
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Control Variables
Mcap
.021
.019
.022
.020
(0.731)
(0.656)
(0.740)
(0.698)
SIC
.081 **
.075 **
.081 **
.076 **
(2.838)
(2.649)
(2.842)
(2.667)
Beta
.087 **
.090 **
.087 **
.089 **
(3.077)
(3.165)
(3.066)
(3.141)
D:E
-.010
-.010
-.009
-.009
(-0.335)
(-0.351)
(-0.330)
(-0.332)
PolRisk
.049
.056 +
.048
.054 +
(1.609)
(1.824)
(1.576)
(1.745)
FrostScore
-.084 **
-.088 **
-.084 **
-.087 **
(-2.903)
(-3.025)
(-2.877)
(-2.966)
Main Effects
CD - Institutional
.008
.012
.009
.018
(0.256)
(0.392)
(0.288)
(0.558)
Interactions
CD-Institutional x PolRisk
.061 *
.065 *
(2.136)
(2.231)
CD-Institutional x FrostScore
.005
.021
(0.158)
(0.666)
2

R
2
Adjusted R
F

.024
.019
4.350 ***

.028
.021
4.388 ***

.024
.018
3.807 ***

.028
.021
3.948 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock.
SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as
the 3 year average monthly beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the
political/regulatory environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between
the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the
disclosure requirement distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s
exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the
absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional collectivism scores for
headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for
institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CDInstitutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and
the exchange disclosure score distance.
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Cost of Equity Capital (OJ)

Cultural Distance
Low (Institutional
Collectivism)
Cultural Distance
High (Institutional
Collectivism)

Political/Regulatory Environment Distance

Cost of Equity Capital (PEG)

Figure 2. Interaction of the Political/Regulatory Environment and Institutional
Collectivism on Cost of Equity Capital using the Ohlson-Juettner Model

Cultural Distance Low
(Institutional
Collectivism)
Cultural Distance High
(Institutional
Collectivism)

Political/Regulatory Environment Distance

Figure 3. Interaction of the Political/Regulatory Environment and Institutional
Collectivism on Cost of Equity Capital using the Price Earnings Growth Model

64

Cost of Equity Capital (GCAPM)

Cultural Distance Low
(Institutional
Collectivism)
Cultural Distance High
(Institutional
Collectivism)

Disclosure Distance

Figure 4. Interaction of the Disclosure Environment and Institutional Collectivism
on Cost of Equity Capital using the Global Capital Asset Pricing Model

4.2 In-group Collectivism
4.2.1 Main Effects
Hypothesis 1b predicts a positive relationship between in-group collectivism distance
(CD–In-group) and cost of equity capital. The hypothesized relationship was tested in Model 1,
which included only the influence of in-group collectivism on cost of equity capital. The
hypothesized relationship was also tested in Models 2 through 4, which included the main
effect of cultural distance and interactions. The regression results for in-group collectivism
appear in Table 8. Panel A presents the results for cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM,
panel B presents the results as measured by OJ, and panel C presents the results as measured
by PEG. The regressions for cost of equity capital measured by ROCE are displayed in Appendix
B because no significant results for the variables under study were found.
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The relationship between in-group collectivism distance and the cost of equity capital is
not significant when measured by GCAPM, OJ, or PEG (Model 1, Panels A, B and C). The cost of
equity capital measured by OJ is marginally significant when the interactions for both
political/regulatory environment and disclosure are included (p<.10, Panel B, Model 4), but are
not in the expected direction. The cost of equity capital measured by PEG is significant and in
the expected direction when the interactions for both political/regulatory environment and
disclosure are included (p<.05, Panel C, Model 4). Based on these results, hypothesis 1b, which
predicts a direct relationship between in-group collectivism distance and cost of equity capital,
is not supported.
4.2.2 Interaction between the Political/Regulatory Environment and In-group Collectivism
Hypothesis 2b predicts that in-group collectivism will moderate the effect of the
political/regulatory environment distance on cost of equity capital. The interaction between ingroup collectivism and the political/regulatory distance is negative and significant when cost of
equity capital is measured by GCAPM (p<.05, Panel A, Model 2; p<.10, Panel A, Model 4), and
significant when cost of equity capital is measured by OJ (p<.10, Panel B, Model 4). The
interaction is negative but not significant when cost of equity capital is measured by PEG.
These relationships are shown graphically in Figures 5 and 6.
When cost of equity capital is measured using GCAPM, the interaction indicates that
when the political/regulatory distance is low, cost of equity capital is lower when in-group
collectivism is low that when it is high. When the political/regulatory distance is high, the cost
of equity capital is higher for both low and high in-group collectivism distances. When cost of
equity capital is measured using OJ, the interaction indicates that when the political/regulatory
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Table 8. OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and In-Group Collectivism
Panel A: Global Capital Asset Pricing Model (GCAPM)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Ingroup

Model 1

Model 2

0.125 ***
(4.302)
-0.035
(-1.232)
0.004
(0.135)
0.038
(1.266)
-0.039
(-1.343)
-0.038
(-1.283)

0.121 ***
(4.151)
-0.036
(-1.253)
0.002
(0.073)
0.078 *
(2.242)
-0.041
(-1.402)
0.064
(1.172)

Interactions
CD-Ingroup xPolRisk

2

0.125 ***
(4.319)
-0.035
(-1.228)
0.004
(0.134)
0.037
(1.232)
-0.038
(-1.309)

0.022
0.018
4.709 ***

0.026
0.021
4.750 ***

Model 4
0.121 ***
(4.172)
-0.035
(-1.249)
0.002
(0.078)
0.074 *
(2.084)
-0.040
(-1.375)

-0.051
(-1.633)

0.047
(0.787)

-0.040
(-1.328)

-0.123 +
(-1.932)
-0.024
(-0.772)

-0.136 *
(-2.215)

CD-Ingroup x FrostScore

R
2
Adjusted R
F

Model 3

0.024
0.018
4.291 ***

0.027
0.020
4.229 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC =
4-digit standard industrial classification. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the
political/regulatory environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG
political risk scores for the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure
requirement distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange
disclosure scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the
difference between the GLOBE institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance
and the political/regulatory environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction
term for institutional collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 8 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and In-Group Collectivism
Panel B: Ohlson-Juettner Model (OJ)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Ingroup

Model 1

Model 2

.019
(-0.660)
.081 **
(2.846)
.090 ***
(3.154)
-.011
(-0.396)
.044
(1.480)
-.086 **
(-2.955)
.018
(0.603)

.017
-0.017
.080
(2.834)
.091
(3.200)
-.012
(-0.437)
.071
(2.035)
-.087
(-2.995)

Model 3

**
***

*
**

.086
(1.568)

Interactions
CD-Ingroup x PolRisk

2

.027
(0.865)

-.091
(-1.476)

CD-Ingroup x FrostScore
R
2
Adjusted R
F

.019
-0.65
.081 **
(2.843)
.090 ***
(3.162)
-.011
(-0.394)
.045
(1.504)
-.086 **
(-2.978)

.025
.020
4.572 ***

.027
.021
4.277 ***

.028
(0.938)
.026
.020
4.110 ***

Model 4
0.015
-0.528
0.080
-2.826
0.092
-3.226
-0.013
(-0.446)
0.079
-2.235
-0.088
(-3.042)

**
***

*
**

0.117 *
-1.977
-0.114 +
(-1.789)
0.043
(1.379)
0.028
0.021
4.016 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC =
4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as the 3 year
average monthly beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory environment
distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the
headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure requirement distance measured as
the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and
host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE
institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk =
the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory
environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional
collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 8 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and In-Group Collectivism
Panel C: Price-Earnings-Growth Model (PEG)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Ingroup

Model 1

Model 2

.022
0.745662
.081 **
(2.839)
.087 **
(3.080)
-0.010
(-0.349)
0.037
(1.241)
-0.084 **
(-2.892)

.020
0.67186
.080
(2.828)
.089
(3.116)
-0.011
(-0.381)
0.058
(1.667)
-0.085
(-2.923)

0.029
(.994)

0.083
(1.516)

Interactions
CD-Ingroup x PolRisk

Model 3

**
**

+
**

2

0.042
(1.343)

-.072
(-1.163)

CD-Ingroup x FrostScore

R
2
Adjusted R
F

.021
0.731885
.080 **
(2.836)
.088 **
(3.093)
-0.010
(-0.347)
0.038
(1.274)
-0.085 **
(-2.925)

.038
(1.279)
.025
.019
4.485 ***

.026
.020
4.095 ***

.026
.020
4.131 ***

Model 4
.018
0.625378
.080
(2.820)
.089
(3.147)
-0.011
(-0.392)
0.068
(1.917)
-0.086
(-2.979)

**
**

+
**

0.120 *
(2.031)
-.099
(-1.558)
.051
(1.646)
.028
.021
3.946 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC =
4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as the 3 year
average monthly beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory environment
distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the
headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure requirement distance measured as
the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and
host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE
institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk =
the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory
environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional
collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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distance is low, the cost of equity capital is higher when the in-group collectivism distance is
high than when it is low. However, when the political/regulatory distance is high, cost of equity
capital is higher when in-group collectivism distance is low, but does not change when in-group
collectivism distance is high. Based on these results, hypothesis 2b, which predicts in-group
collectivism will moderate the effect of the political/regulatory environment on cost of equity
capital, is supported.
4.2.3 Interaction between Disclosure and In-group Collectivism
Hypothesis 3b predicts that in-group collectivism distance will moderate the effect of
disclosure distance on cost of equity capital. The interactions were not significant for any cost
of equity capital measure used in this study. Based on these results, hypothesis 3b is not

Cost of Equity Capital (GCAPM)

supported.

Cultural Distance
Low (Ingroup
Collectivism)
Cultural Distance
High (Ingroup
Collectivism)

Political/Regulatory Distance
Figure 5. Interaction of the Political/Regulatory Environment and In-group
Collectivism on Cost of Equity Capital using the Global Capital Asset Pricing
Model
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Cost of Equity Capital (OJ)

Cultural Distance
Low (Ingroup
Collectivism)
Cultural Distance
High (Ingroup
Collectivism)

Political/Regulatory Environment
Figure 6. Interaction of the Political/Regulatory Environment and In-group
Collectivism on Cost of Equity Capital using the Ohlson-Jeuttner Model

4.3 Uncertainty Avoidance
4.3.1 Main Effects
Hypothesis 1c predicted a positive relationship between uncertainty avoidance distance
(CD-Uncertainty Avoidance) and cost of equity capital. The hypothesized relationship was
tested in Model 1, which included only the influence of uncertainty avoidance on cost of equity
capital. The hypothesized relationship was also tested in Models 2 through 4, which included
the main effect of cultural distance and interactions. The regression results for uncertainty
avoidance appear in Table 9. Panel A presents the results for cost of equity capital measured by
GCAPM, panel B presents the results as measured by OJ, and panel C presents the results as
measured by PEG. The regressions for cost of equity capital measured by ROCE are displayed in
Appendix B because no significant results for the variables under study were found.
The relationship between uncertainty avoidance distance and the cost of equity capital
measured by GCAPM is in the predicted direction and is significant (p<.05, Panel A, Model 1).
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This relationship remains significant when the interactions between the political/regulatory
environment distance and the disclosure distance is added (p<.01, Panel A, Model 2; p<.05,
Panel A, Model 3; p<.01, Panel A, Model 4). The relationships between uncertainty avoidance,
OJ and PEG are in the predicted direction, but are not significant. Based on these results,
hypothesis 1c, that predicts a direct relationship between uncertainty avoidance and cost of
equity capital, is partially supported.
4.3.2 Interaction between the Political/Regulatory Environment and Uncertainty Avoidance.
Hypothesis 2c predicts that uncertainty avoidance distance moderates the effect of the
political/regulatory environment distance on cost of equity capital. The interaction between
uncertainty avoidance and the political/regulatory distance is negative and significant when
cost of equity capital is measured by GCAPM (p<.10, Panel A, Model 2; Model 4 <p=.10). The
interaction is not significant when cost of equity capital is measured by OJ and PEG (Panels B
and C, Models 2 and 4). The interaction, when GCAPM is used to measure cost of equity
capital, is shown graphically in Figure 7.
This interaction indicates that when the political/regulatory distance is low, cost of
equity capital is lower when uncertainty avoidance distance is low than when it is high. When
the political/regulatory distance is high, the cost of equity capital is lower for both high and low
uncertainty avoidance distance, although the distance between the points is smaller. Based on
these results, hypothesis 2c, which predicts that uncertainty avoidance distance moderates the
effect of the political/regulatory distance on cost of equity capital, is supported.
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Table 9. OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Uncertainty Avoidance
Panel A: Global Capital Asset Pricing Model (GCAPM)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Uncertainty Avoidance

Model 1

Model 2

.121 ***
(4.146)
-.036
(-1.280)
.004
(0.124)
.031
(1.091)
-.046
(-1.571)
.063 *
(2.231)

Interactions
CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x PolRisk

.120 ***
(4.133)
-.031
(-1.092)
.004
(0.124)
-.124
(-1.410)
-.047
(-1.625)
.095 **
(2.874)

2

.121 ***
(4.150)
-.036
(-1.284)
.003
(0.120)
.025
(0.778)
-.046
(-1.571)
.072 *
(1.994)

-.169 +
(-0.169)

CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x FrostScore
R
2
Adjusted R
F

Model 3

.025
.020
5.277 ***

.028
.022
5.027 ***

.015
(0.387)
.025
.020
4.541 ***

Model 4
.120 ***
(4.137)
-.031
(-1.093)
.003
(0.119)
-.136
(-1.498)
-.047
(-1.628)
.108 **
(2.650)
-.173 +
(-1.899)
.021
(0.538)
.028
.022
4.433 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC =
4-digit standard industrial classification. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the
political/regulatory environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG
political risk scores for the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure
requirement distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange
disclosure scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the
difference between the GLOBE institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance
and the political/regulatory environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction
term for institutional collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 9 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Uncertainty Avoidance
Panel B: Ohlson-Juettner Model (OJ)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Uncertainty Avoidance

Model 1
.017
(0.575)
.079
(2.802)
.092
(3.234)
-.011
(-0.371)
.053
(1.860)
-.090
(-3.089)

Model 2

**
***

+
**

.039
(1.384)

.017
(0.583)
.076 **
(2.683)
.091 ***
(3.210)
-.011
(-0.372)
.143
(1.631)
-.089 **
(-3.055)
.021
(0.623)

Interactions
CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x PolRisk

.017
(0.583)
.079 **
(2.794)
.092 ***
(3.232)
-.011
(-0.378)
.042
(1.318)
-.090 **
(-3.090)

.026
.021
4.800 ***

.027
.021
4.349 ***

Model 4
.017
(0.590)
.076 **
(2.680)
.091 ***
(3.209)
-.011
(-0.378)
.130
(1.439)
-.089 **
(-3.058)

.054
(1.506)

.035
(0.849)

.027
(0.675)

.094
(1.038)
.023
(0.590)

.099
(1.089)

CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x FrostScore

R2
Adjusted R2
F

Model 3

.027
.021
4.255 ***

.028
.021
3.902 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC = 4-digit
standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as the 3 year average monthly
beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory environment distance, measured as the
absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter and host countries.
FrostScore = the disclosure requirement distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s
exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the
difference between the GLOBE institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CDInstitutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory
environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism
distance and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 9 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Uncertainty Avoidance
Panel C: Price-Earnings-Growth Model (PEG)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Uncertainty Avoidance

Model 1
.020
(0.667)
.079
(2.794)
.090
(3.147)
-.009
(-0.317)
.049
(1.725)
-.088
(-3.011)

Model 2

**
**

+
**

.020
(0.677)
.075
(2.643)
.089
(3.117)
-.009
(-0.317)
.167
(1.898)
-.087
(-2.968)

.036
(1.251)

Model 3

**
**

+
**

.011
(0.340)

Interactions
CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x
PolRisk

.020
(0.674)
.079 **
(2.787)
.090 **
(3.145)
-.009
(-0.323)
.040
(1.242)
-.088 **
(-3.012)
.049
(1.345)

.128

2

R
2
Adjusted R
F

.025
.020
4.570 ***

.027
.021
4.252 ***

.020
(0.683)
.075
(2.641)
.089
(3.116)
-.009
(-0.322)
.157
(1.725)
-.087
(-2.970)

**
**

+
**

.023
(0.551)
.125

(1.417)
CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x
FrostScore

Model 4

.023

(1.374)
.019

(0.585)

(0.473)

.026
.019
4.039 ***

.027
.020
3.802 ***

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC
= 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as the 3
year average monthly beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory
environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk
scores for the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure requirement
distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure
scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the
difference between the GLOBE institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism
distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the
interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score
distance.

75

Cost of Equity Capital
(GCAPM)

Cultural Distance
Low (Uncertainty
Avoidance)
Cultural Distance
High (Uncertainty
Avoidance)
Political/Regulatory Environment Distance

Figure 7. Interaction of the Political/Regulatory Environment and In-group
Collectivism on Cost of Equity Capital using the Ohlson-Jeuttner Model

4.3.3 Disclosure and Uncertainty Avoidance
Hypothesis 3c predicts that uncertainty avoidance distance will moderate the effect of
the disclosure distance on cost of equity. The interactions were not significant for any cost of
equity capital measure used in this study. Based on these results, hypothesis 3c is not
supported.
4.4 Power Distance
4.4.1 Main Effect
Hypothesis 1d predicts a positive relationship between power distance - distance (CDPower Distance) and cost of equity capital. The hypothesized relationship was tested in Model
1, which included only the influence of power distance on cost of equity capital. The
hypothesized relationship was also tested in Models 2 through 4, which included the main
effect of cultural distance and interactions. The regression results for uncertainty avoidance
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appear in Table 10. Panel A presents the results for cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM,
panel B presents the results as measured by OJ, and panel C presents the results as measured
by PEG. The regressions for cost of equity capital measured by ROCE are displayed in Appendix
B because no significant results for the variables under study were found.
The relationship between power distance and the cost of equity capital measured by
GCAPM is in the predicted direction and is significant (Model 1, p<.10), but is not significant in
the interaction models. The relationship between power distance, OJ and PEG are not
significant in any models. Based on these results, hypothesis 1d, that predicts a direct
relationship between power distance and cost of equity capital, is not supported.
4.4.2 Interaction between the Political/Regulatory Environment and Power Distance.
Hypothesis 2d predicts that power distance will moderate the effect of the
political/regulatory environment distance on cost of equity. The interactions were not
significant for any cost of equity capital measure used in this study. Based on these results,
hypothesis 2d is not supported.
4.4.3 Interaction between Disclosure and Power Distance.
Hypothesis 3d predicts that power distance-distance will moderate the effect of the
disclosure requirement distance on the cost of equity capital. The interactions were not
significant for any cost of equity capital measure used in this study. Based on these results,
hypothesis 3d is not supported.
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Table 10. OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Power Distance
Panel A: Global Capital Asset Pricing Model (GCAPM)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Power Distance

Model 1

Model 2

.122 ***
(4.195)
-.033
(-1.168)
.002
(0.065)
.044
(1.458)
-.041
(-1.427)

.122 ***
(4.185)
-.035
(-1.230)
.002
(0.069)
.056
(1.611)
-.041
(-1.414)

.051 +
(1.664)

.045
(1.414)

Interactions
CD-Power Distance x PolRisk

2

.122 ***
(4.202)
-.032
(-1.137)
.002
(0.064)
.047
(1.528)
-.041
(-1.398)

.023
.018
4.900 ***

.024
.018
4.267 ***

Model 4
.122 ***
(4.195)
-.035
(-1.212)
.002
(0.069)
.065 +
(1.779)
-.040
(-1.367)

.065
(1.640)

.064
(1.621)

.021
(0.570)
.023
.018
4.245 ***

.034
(0.911)
.032
(0.821)
.024
.018
3.817 ***

.025
(0.694)

CD-Power Distance x FrostScore
R
2
Adjusted R
F

Model 3

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC = 4digit standard industrial classification. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory
environment distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for
the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure requirement distance measured as
the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction
term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CDInstitutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the
exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 10 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Power Distance
Panel B: Ohlson-Juettner Model (OJ)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Power Distance

Model 1

Model 2

.020
(0.671)
.080 **
(2.832)
.089 **
(3.133)
-.011
(-0.376)
.047
(1.544)
-.085 **
(-2.938)

.019
(0.659)
.077
(2.697)
.090
(3.158)
-.011
(-0.369)
.068
(1.952)
-.085
(-2.918)

-.007
(-0.237)

-.018
(-0.562)

Interactions
CD-Power Distance x PolRisk

Model 3

**
**

+
**

R2
Adjusted R2
F

.019
(0.664)
.080 **
(2.799)
.090 **
(3.149)
-.011
(-0.375)
.044
(1.438)
-.086 **
(-2.961)

.019
(0.656)
.077 **
(2.691)
.090 **
(3.161)
-.010
(-0.369)
.066
(1.813)
-.085 **
(-2.923)

-.022
(-0.547)

-.023
(-0.569)

-.021
(-0.569)
.025
.019
4.000 ***

.042
(1.120)
-.008
(-0.202)
.026
.019
3.695 ***

.044
(1.240)

CD-Power Distance x FrostScore
.025
.019
4.527 ***

.026
.020
4.155 ***

Model 4

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC = 4digit standard industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as the 3 year
average monthly beta. D:E = debt to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory environment
distance, measured as the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the
headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure requirement distance measured as the
absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for headquarter and host
countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction
term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CDInstitutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the
exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 10 (Continued). OLS Regression – Cost of Equity Capital and Power DistancePanel C:
Price-Earnings-Growth Model (PEG)
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Power Distance

Model 1

Model 2

.022
(0.757)
.080 **
(2.820)
.087 **
(3.053)
-.009
(-0.320)
.043
(1.416)
-.083 **
(-2.873)

.022
(0.745)
.077
(2.688)
.088
(3.077)
-.009
(-0.313)
.063
(1.821)
-.083
(-2.853)

-.008
(-0.272)

-.018
(-0.585)

Interactions
CD-Power Distance x PolRisk

Model 3

**
**

+
**

2

R
2
Adjusted R
F

.022
(0.746)
.079 **
(2.769)
.088 **
(3.082)
-.009
(-0.317)
.039
(1.260)
-.085 **
(-2.913)

.022
(0.739)
.076 **
(2.674)
.088 **
(3.092)
-.009
(-0.312)
.057
(1.583)
-.084 **
(-2.879)

-.031
(-0.790)

-.032
(-0.809)

-.034
(-0.906)
.025
.018
3.909 ***

.036
(0.971)
-.022
(-0.568)
.025
.018
3.580 ***

.042
(1.201)

CD-Power Distance x FrostScore
.024
.019
4.351 ***

.025
.019
3.989 ***

Model 4

Standardized coefficients shown. t-values in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock. SIC = 4-digit standard
industrial classification. Beta = individual stock volatility, measured as the 3 year average monthly beta. D:E = debt
to equity ratio. PolRisk = the political/regulatory environment distance, measured as the absolute difference
between the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter and host countries. FrostScore = the disclosure
requirement distance measured as the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for
headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE
institutional collectivism scores for headquarter and host countries. CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction
term for institutional collectivism distance and the political/regulatory environment distance. CD-Institutional x
FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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4.5 Sensitivity Analyses
In addition to estimating regressions using each of the four cultural distance variables
individually, regressions were estimated using aggregate cultural distance variables, factored
cultural distance variables, and all cultural distance variables entered simultaneously. Each of
these is discussed separately in the following sections.
4.5.1 Aggregate Cultural Distance Variables
Two aggregate measures of cultural distance were constructed. The first aggregate
measure was calculated as the average of the sum of the absolute values of the differences on
each cultural dimension between headquarter and host countries.
CD_Aggregate_Avg = (|Insti - Instj |+|Ingrpi - Ingrpj|+|UAi - UAj |+ |PDi - PDj| )/4
Where:
CD_Aggregate Avg = Average aggregate cultural distance
Inst = Institutional collectivism value
Ingrp = In-group collectivism value
UA = Uncertainty avoidance value
PD = Power distance value
i = Headquarter country
j = Host country
The second aggregate measure was calculated as the sum of the relative magnitude of
the absolute value of the cultural distance for each individual cultural distance variable.
CE_Aggregate RM = |Insti - Instj |/ [(Insti + Instj ) /2] + |Ingrpi - Ingrpj|/[(Ingrpi +
Ingrpj)/2] + |UAi - UAj |/[( UAi + UAj)/2] + |PDi - PDj|/[( PDi + PDj)/2]
Where:
CD_Aggregate Avg = Average aggregate cultural distance
Inst = Institutional collectivism value
Ingrp = In-group collectivism value
UA = Uncertainty avoidance value
PD = Power distance value
i = Headquarter country
j = Host country
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Regressions were performed using each aggregate cost of equity capital variable
individually on each cost of equity capital measure. Neither aggregate cultural distance variable
was significant in any model.
4.5.2 Factored Cultural Distance Variables
A principle component analysis with varimax rotation of the four cost of equity capital
variables was performed. Two components were extracted: Institutional/PD and In-group/UA.
These pairings confirm GLOBE study results, which found institutional collectivism practices to
be significantly and negatively related to power distance practices and in-group collectivism
practices to be significantly and negatively related to uncertainty avoidance practices (House et
al., 2004, pp. 472, 473).
Regressions were performed using both components together as well as separately for
each cost of equity capital variable. When the cost of equity capital is measured with GCAPM,
the main effect of in-group/uncertainty avoidance is significant (p<.05). In the single dimension
cultural distance models, uncertainty avoidance is significant (p<.05), and in-group collectivism
is not significant, which suggests that in the factored cost of equity capital measure, uncertainty
avoidance is the source of the relationship with GCAPM. None of the interactions are
significant when the components for cultural distance variables are used. When the cost of
equity capital is measured with OJ or PEG, none of the models are significant. These results are
consistent with the results of the single dimension models.
4.5.3 Multiple Cultural Distance Variables
Regression analyses were performed that included all four cultural distance measures
were added simultaneously. As expected, the models show high levels of multicollinearity.
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Some of the significant rerelationships in the complete model were also significant in the
individual models : the main effect of power distance on cost of equity capital measure by
GCAPM; the interaction between political risk/regulatory distance when cost of equity capital
is measured by GCAPM; the interaction between political risk/regulatory distance when cost of
equity capital is measured by GCAPM). In general, uncertainty avoidance distance and in-group
collectivism distance were more significant in the complete model than they were in the
individual models. The problems with high levels of multicollinearity when all four cultural
distance models indicate that analyses with individual cultural distance variables is appropriate.
4.5.4 Observations Included versus Excluded
One-way ANOVA analyses were used to determine whether or not the cultural distance
measures are different between the group of observations for which there was sufficient data
to calculate the cost of equity measures and the group of data for which there was not
sufficient data to calculate the cost of equity measures. Levene tests indicated that variances
between the groups were not equal, so Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests were used to evaluate
the ANOVA results. The results are presented in Table 11.
The results of the ANOVAs indicate that institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism,
and uncertainty avoidance are significantly different between the group for which cost of
equity capital could be calculated and the group for which cost of equity capital could not be
calculated for all four measures of cost of equity capital. Power distance is not significantly
different between the groups when cost of equity capital was measured using OJ, PEG, and
ROCE.
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Table 11. Mean Differences on Cultural Distance Measures between
Cost of Equity Capital Calculated and Not Calculated
Brown-Forsythe
Value

F value
GCAPM
Institutional Collectivism distance
In-group Collectivism distance
Uncertainty Avoidance distance
Power Distance distance

95.1
48.4
8.3
84.8

***
***
***
***

87.8
43.8
7.8
74.9

***
***
***
***

OJ
Institutional Collectivism distance
In-group Collectivism distance
Uncertainty Avoidance distance
Power Distance distance

81.7 ***
149.6 ***
346.1 ***
1.5

195.3 ***
351.6 ***
794.2 ***
3.6

PEG
Institutional Collectivism distance
In-group Collectivism distance
Uncertainty Avoidance distance
Power Distance distance

81.6 ***
149.4 ***
345.7 ***
1.5

195.2 ***
351.4 ***
793.7 ***
3.6

98.9 ***
184.6 ***
419.6 ***
2.0

198.3 ***
364.4 ***
810.7 ***
3.9

ROCE
Institutional Collectivism distance
In-group Collectivism distance
Uncertainty Avoidance distance
Power Distance distance
***p<.001
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1

Discussion
This study investigates the impact of cultural distance on the cost of equity capital for

firms cross-listing on two exchanges. The main premise is that investors demand higher returns
from foreign companies due to perceptions of risk caused by a lack of familiarity with the
foreign culture. Therefore, the higher the cultural distance between headquarter and host
countries, the greater the expected cost of equity capital. Data from 1,243 cross-listed firms
were investigated. Cost of equity capital was measured four different ways: the global capital
asset pricing model (GCAPM), the Ohlson-Juettner model (OJ), the price-earnings-growth model
(PEG), and return on common equity (ROCE). The GLOBE cultural dimensions investigated were
institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance.
Cultural distance was also expected to moderate the effect of political/regulatory distance and
disclosure distance on the cost of equity capital. The discussion regarding the impact of each
cultural dimension is presented first, followed by a discussion of culture in general.
The first cultural dimension investigated is institutional collectivism. Institutional
collectivism refers to practices that emphasize and reward collective actions versus individual
actions and achievements. Institutional collectivism distance is expected to have a negative
direct relationship with cost of equity capital; this relationship is not supported for any of the
cost of equity capital measures used in this study. Institutional collectivism distance is expected
to moderate the relationship between the political/regulatory environment and cost of equity
capital; this relationship was found to be significant, but in the opposite direction for two of the
three cost of equity capital measures: OJ and PEG. The interaction indicates that cost of equity
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capital is lower when political/regulatory distance is low and institutional collectivism distance
is high versus when institutional collectivism is low. It appears, from these results, that when
the political/regulatory environments are similar investors perceive similarity between
institutional collectivism levels to be a negative factor, and therefore riskier. It is only when the
political/regulatory environments are quite different that institutional collectivism distance
appears to be perceived as a favorable condition. This finding is intriguing, and requires
additional study to confirm the moderating impact of the political/regulatory environment and
institutional collectivism.
The interaction between disclosure distance and institutional collectivism distance was
only significant for cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM. The cost of equity capital is
lower when both institutional collectivism distance and disclosure distance are high than when
they are low. This suggests that institutional collectivism distance ameliorates, rather that
exacerbates, the impact of disclosure on the cost of equity capital.
5.1.2 In-group collectivism
The second cultural dimension investigated is in-group collectivism. In-group
collectivism refers to the extent to which individuals identify with and are connected to a
specific in-group, such as family or a work group. In-group collectivism distance is expected to
have a positive direct relationship with cost of equity capital; this relationship is not supported
for any of the cost of equity capital measures used in this study. However, in-group collectivism
distance moderates the effect of political/regulatory distance and disclosure distance on the
cost of equity capital.
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The interaction between in-group collectivism distance and political/regulatory
environment distance is significant when cost of equity capital is measured by GCAPM and OJ.
Cost of equity capital is lower when political/regulatory distance is low and in-group
collectivism is low than it is when in-group collectivism distance is high. When
political/regulatory distance is large, cost of equity capital is much closer, regardless in-group
collectivism distance.
The interaction between in-group collectivism distance and disclosure distance is not
significant for any model. In-group collectivism does not appear to have a moderating effect on
disclosure.
5.1.3 Uncertainty Avoidance
The third cultural dimension investigated is uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty
avoidance refers to a society’s desire to minimize the unexpected through laws, behavioral
norms, and structure. Uncertainly avoidance is expected to have a positive direct relationship
with cost of equity capital. This relationship is in the expected direction for all cost of equity
capital measures, but is significant only for GCAPM.
The interaction between political/regulatory distance and uncertainty avoidance
distance is expected to have a positive relationship with cost of equity capital. The interaction
is in the expected direction, but is not significant, for OJ and PEG. The interaction is significant,
but not in the expected direction, when the cost of equity capital is measured by GCAPM. The
cost of capital is lower overall when uncertainty avoidance distance is low than when it is high.
However, as the political/regulatory distance increases, GCAPM cost of equity capital decreases
for both high and low levels of uncertainty avoidance distance.
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The interaction between disclosure distance and uncertainty avoidance distance is
positive for all cost of equity capital measures used in this study, but is not significant for any of
them. These results suggest that uncertainty avoidance distance does not moderate the effect
of disclosure distance on cost of equity capital.
5.1.4 Power Distance
The fourth cultural dimension to be investigated is power distance. Power distance
refers to a society’s acceptance of authority, power, and status differences. Power distancedistance is expected to have a positive direct relationship with cost of equity capital. This
relationship is in the expected direction and significant only as a direct effect when cost of
equity capital is measured using GCAPM. When cost of equity capital is measured using OJ and
PEG, power distance-distance is negative and not significant.
The interaction between political/regulatory distance and power distance-distance is
expected to have a positive relationship with cost of equity capital. The interaction is in the
expected direction, but is not significant, for any of the cost of equity capital measures.
The interaction between disclosure distance and power distance-distance is positive,
but not significant, for GCAPM, and negative but not significant for OJ and PEG. These results
suggest that power distance-distance does not moderate the effect of disclosure distance on
cost of equity capital.
5.1.5 Discussion Summary
Overall, collectivism (institutional and in-group), uncertainty avoidance, and power
distance appear to have limited effects on the cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM, OJ,
and PEG. Of the four cultural distance measures, only uncertainty avoidance distance and
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power distance-distance have direct effects on cost of equity capital, and only when the cost of
equity capital is measured by GCAPM. OJ and PEG appear to be unaffected by cultural distance.
Institutional collectivism distance moderates the effect of the political/regulatory
distance on the cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM, OJ, and PEG. Other moderating
effects occur, but they are significant for cost of equity capital measured by GCAPM or OJ or
PEG, not for all three. For example, institutional collectivism has a moderating effect on
disclosure distance for GCAPM, but not for OJ or PEG. ROCE is unaffected by any of the cultural
distance measures used in this study.
In general, the effect of disclosure on cost of equity capital is not affected by the cultural
distance measures used in this study. Only institutional collectivism distance moderated the
influence of disclosure distance, and only when cost of equity capital was measured using
GCAPM.
These results suggest that the impact of cultural distance on cost of equity capital
depends on how cost of equity capital is measured. GCAPM is the cost of equity capital
measure most affected by cultural distance in this study. It is the only measure with an
expected return component based on a global index, and it is the only measure that does not
use firm performance measures such as earnings and dividends in the calculation. These
differences may account for GCAPM’s relative sensitivity to cultural distance.
The sample used in this study was restricted to firms for which data was available in
Compustat North America, resulting in a heavy bias towards U.S. firms trading on German
exchanges. It is possible the results found in this study are due to the sample composition. The
sample consisted of 1243 companies, of which 1214 (97.7%) are headquartered in the U.S.
89

Germany is the host country for 1230 (99%) of the 1243 companies. The cultural distance of the
companies in the sample is limited because most of the companies are headquartered in the
U.S. and cross-listed in Germany. Therefore, these results may represent European investor
confidence the U.S. economy in general. For the years the data was collected, the U.S. economy
was performing (or expected to perform) better than the E.U. economy (Cotis, 2006).
Furthermore, given the close trade ties between the U.S. and Germany (Ahearn & Belkin, 2010),
it is possible any potential effects of cultural distance are mitigated by the long-term
relationship between the two countries. Given that GCAPM is the only model that estimates
cost of equity capital based on global returns, the U.S. – German connection may also explain
why the interaction effects are generally insignificant for OJ and PEG.
5.2

Limitations
This study is subject to several limitations. The limitation most likely to have impacted

the results of this study was the problem with missing financial data – particularly missing data
from firms located outside the U.S. and Germany. This resulted in a dataset that was heavily
biased towards U.S. firms trading on German exchanges. As a result, cultural difference may
not have been sufficiently diverse to capture the true extent of the influence of cultural
distance on cost of equity capital. Table 12 summarizes the cultural dimension scores of
Germany and U.S. The largest difference is on uncertainty avoidance, which was also the
strongest direct effect, when measured by GCAPM.
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Table 12. Globe Cultural Dimension Scores for Germany and the U.S.
Cultural Dimension
Germany
U.S.
Absolute
Difference
Institutional Collectivism
3.68
4.20
0.52
In-group Collectivism
4.27
4.25
0.02
Uncertainty Avoidance
5.19
4.15
1.04
Power Distance
5.25
4.88
0.37

The analysis comparing the cultural distance for companies in the sample and
companies excluded from the sample suggest that the results may have been different if the
additional data, primarily from non-U.S. and non-German companies had been available. To
enhance generalizability, future research should examine the impact of cultural distance on
cost of equity capital with a more diverse set of countries represented.
Second, this study focuses on the magnitude of cultural difference, measured as the
absolute value of the cultural dimension (Sivakumar & Nakata, 2001). This measure is
consistent with other cultural distance measures, such as the Kogut and Singh’s measure
(1988) and Euclidian distance measures (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). All three of these
methods measure cultural distance based on non-directional distance, or magnitude, by either
taking the absolute value of cultural distance or squaring cultural distance. However, the
benefits derived from cross-listing may depend on the direction of the listing. Studies based on
bonding theory generally find that find that firms from countries with weak investor protection
and enforcement benefit more from cross-listing into countries with better investor protection
and enforcement because the companies are signaling potential investors about the
companies’ intent to be held to higher standards than those found in the home country (John C.
Coffee, 2002; Doidge et al., 2004; Hail & Leuz, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, &
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Vishny, 2002). Therefore, the direction of the cultural difference, as well as the size of cultural
distance, may impact the cost of equity capital.
Third, I examine only one year of data in this study. Cross-sectional samples can be
subject to some serious problems in social science research. In this study, the cross-sectional
selection allows for the comparison of cost of capital using four measures for the same set of
companies at the same point in time. However, Rumelt (1991)notes that making inferences
about theoretical relationships is problematic when using cross-sectional data because year-toyear variations may change results. Bergh (1995) notes that the use of cross-sectional data
limits the scope for understanding true relationships between dependent and independent
variables. Huselid and Baker (1996) note that heterogeneity bias is a problem with crosssectional samples – in this study, this means the relationship between cost of equity capital and
cultural distance may reflect differences among unobserved firm characteristics in the sample,
at a single point in time, rather than a true relationship between the variables of interest. Panel
data can improve the interpretation of the relationship between independent and dependent
variables by looking at the persistence of the relationship over time. However, Huselid and
Baker also note that measurement errors in panel data have a larger impact on results than do
measurement errors in cross-sectional data. Bowen and Wiersema (1999) note that crosssectional samples make the assumption that firm-specific characteristics that are related to the
dependent variable are stable over time, which is generally not true. The results studies based
on cross-sectional data may, therefore, fail to be statistically valid. Although cultural distance
is believed to be fairly stable over time (Hofstede, 1980), and the country level variables of
political risk and information asymmetry (disclosure) probably don’t change a great deal over
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time, particularly for the sample used in this study, the firm-level characteristics are unlikely to
be stable over time. To summarize, the results of this study are for too short a time frame to
confirm the relationship between cost of equity capital and cultural distance, and the results
are not generalizable. Future research should examine the cost of equity capital and cultural
distance relationship over time.
Fourth, in this study measures for countries’ economic environment were not included.
Although the political/regulatory measures have a relationship with economic measures, a
more complete picture of the factors affecting cost of equity capital might be presented by
including economic measures separately.
Fifth, although OLS regression is commonly used in cross-cultural research, as
recommended by Lenartowicz and Kendall (1999), and in accounting and finance research in
general, it is not ideally suited for research involving variables that occur at difference levels of
analysis. This study includes country, industry, and firm level variables. Bryk and Raudenbush
(1992, pp. 83 - 84) identify several problems related to the use of common multivariate
methods in social science research involving variables occurring at different levels of analysis.
Specifically, they mention aggregation bias (a variable may measure different constructs at
different levels), misestimated standard errors (dependence among individual responses in the
same organization), and heterogeneity of regression (individual characteristics and outcomes
vary across organizations).
Although hierarchical linear modeling is a conceptually superior analysis technique
when variables occur at different levels of analysis, whether or not overall conclusions based on
hierarchical linear modeling versus OLS are significantly different is unclear. For example, Loeb
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(2003) prepared a comparative analysis of salary differences data using hierarchical linear
modeling and OLS. The data, based on survey responses from 464 full-time faculty in 22 fouryear universities included three levels of variables: type of university (institutional level
variables), academic department (department level variables), and individual professional
characteristics (individual level variables). She found the results of the hierarchical linear model
and the OLS analyses were very similar, although both had advantages. Advantages of
hierarchical linear modeling included appropriate modeling of the dependency between
observations, which resulted in unbiased coefficient estimates, and the likelihood of more
stable coefficient estimates. The primary advantage of OLS was the ease of explaining the
meaning of the results. Lee (2003) examined the relationship between job and organizational
commitment at the individual and group levels using data from 660 sales agents working in
different agencies of a large international insurance company. He found role clarity and job
satisfaction were significant in predicting organizational commitment in both the OLS and
hierarchical linear models. He also found that hierarchical linear modeling coefficient estimates
showed much less variation than the OLS estimates. The results of these two studies suggest
that the overall interpretation of the general relationships being explored may not differ
between OLS and hierarchical linear modeling, although the precision and reliability of the
coefficient estimates is better when hierarchical linear modeling is used.
Additionally, hierarchical linear modeling is not widely used in the accounting and
finance literature. Queries of five well respected accounting and finance journals11 found only

11

Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Finance, and
Journal of Financial Economics.
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three articles published in the past 10 years that used hierarchical linear modeling, even when
the data occurred at different levels of analysis.
Therefore, the use of OLS in the present study is consistent with the dominant method
of analysis used in the accounting literature, and probably provides an adequate picture of how
culture affects cost of equity capital, although the coefficient estimates are not as precise as
they would be using hierarchical linear modeling. However, future research in this area should
incorporate the more technically appropriate hierarchical linear modeling.
Sixth, additional cultural dimensions need to be examined to develop a more complete
picture of how cultural dimensions impact cost of equity capital. I examined four of nine
possible cultural dimensions from the GLOBE study. It is quite possible that other GLOBE
dimensions, such as performance orientation, may be related to cost of equity capital. Other
dimensions, such as those proposed by Schwartz dimensions (1994a, 1994b, 1999) were not
considered in this study, but they may add to our knowledge concerning the effect of culture on
financial aspects of business, including the cost of equity capital.
5.3

Conclusion
This study extends the research on the effect of cultural differences in global business

operations by bringing together agency, home bias, and cultural familiarity theories to explain
and examine how national culture impacts cost of equity capital in cross-listed firms. Results
suggest that national culture impacts cost of equity capital both directly as an additional risk
factor, and indirectly through its moderating effect on the risk associated with
political/regulatory environments and disclosure. There is also evidence that the effect of
national culture on cost of equity capital depends on how cost of equity capital is measured.
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From a practical perspective, this study may provide an initial step towards helping
corporate financial managers understand how cultural differences impact cost of equity capital,
which in turn may help them in selecting where to cross-list company equity offerings.
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APPENDIX A - GLOBE, HOFSTEDE, AND SCHWARTZ CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

The GLOBE Dimensions
Nine societal cultural dimensions are identified in GLOBE (House et al., 2004): Performance
Orientation, Future Orientation, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism,
In Group Collectivism, Power Distance, Humane Orientation , and Uncertainty Avoidance.
Performance orientation refers to how innovation, high standards, and performance
improvement is rewarded. Very performance oriented societies tend to value and reward
(financially) individual performance and initiative – in other words, results. Competition,
assertiveness, materialism, and directness are valued in the high performance orientation
society.
Future orientation refers to deferring of immediate gratification in favor of long-term and/or
collective gratification. Highly future oriented societies are likely to emphasize planning in the
present for an outcome in the distant future. They will also tend to evaluate history and
tradition in terms of how the past can educate society about what should be done in the future.
Therefore, highly future oriented societies are unlikely to follow tradition for the sake of
tradition – rather, they will follow tradition only if it worked in the past and is expected to work
in the future.
Gender egalitarianism refers to the degree to which a society minimizes gender role
differences. High gender egalitarianism societies are likely to have similar educational levels for
both males and females, have lower levels of occupational gender segregation, and have a
more equal balance of men and women in positions of authority.
Assertiveness refers to the degree of confrontational or aggressive behavior accepted in social
relationships. High assertiveness societies value competition, initiative, control, and clear,
direct, pointed communications. There is also a tendency to emphasize results over
relationships and to reward performance. Many characteristics of assertiveness are also
characteristics of performance orientation, described below.
Institutional collectivism refers to the degree to which collective action and distribution of
resources is encouraged and rewarded by organizations and society. Societies high on
institutional collectivism tend to be future and performance oriented, and uncertainty
avoidant, but seek to achieve these objectives in a way that emphasizes collective efforts that
are not overly assertive or dominating. This suggests a belief in teamwork to achieve goals and
objectives.
In-group collectivism refers to individual identification and loyalty to family and/or specific
groups. Societies high on in-group collectivism tend to have very close family and/or work
groups in which there is a well-defined respect for authority, a clear hierarchy, and a sense of
camaraderie and cohesiveness within the group. High in-group collectivism is marked by a
focus on the present and a non-confrontational attitude.
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Power distance refers to the expectation and acceptance of social inequality. This implies that
power is and should be concentrated at higher levels of government and business, although
House et al. (2004) point out that power distance results from how power is used, not from an
unequal distribution of power. Societies high in power distance tend to value hard-work and
obedience, and downplay autonomy and individual empowerment.
Humane orientation refers to the degree of societal/organizational emphasis on behaviors such
as fairness, altruism, generosity, and kindness. Societies high in humane orientation value a
sense of belonging and emphasize the need for relationships. Promoting the well-being of
others is the responsibility of the private sector (that is, society as a whole), rather than the
state, although the state helps support these private efforts. There is a strong sense of
solidarity.
Uncertainty avoidance refers to minimizing uncertainty by relying on norms, standards and
structures. Uncertainty avoidant societies rely on established social norms, procedures, and
laws to define and guide appropriate behaviors among members of society in order to increase
predictability and reduce anxiety when dealing with unfamiliar situations. Uncertainty avoidant
cultures are also more likely to take calculated, moderate risks and to be more resistant to
change.
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions
Hofstede (2001) identified a total of five national cultural dimensions: Power distance,
Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism/Collectivism, Masculinity/Femininity, and Longterm/Short-term orientation.
Power distance refers to the degree to which unequal distribution of power and authority is
expected and accepted by less powerful members of society. In countries with high power
distance there is a clear and acceptable demarcation between superiors and subordinates, and
subordinates consider crossing these lines unacceptable.
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the degree to which members of a society feel threatened by
uncertain situations. In countries that are high in uncertainty avoidance, there is typically an
emphasis on formal or informal rules, procedures, and norms that offer structure to situations
and make them more predictable. Additionally, there are relatively higher levels of anxiety,
lower levels of ambition, higher levels of aversion to unknown risks and more resistance to
change.
Individualism/collectivism is refers to the degree to which members of a society prefer loose or
strong ties to other individuals outside the immediate family group. In individualistic societies,
each person’s responsibility and loyalty is to themselves and their immediate family. In
collectivistic societies, a person’s responsibility and loyalty is to their in-group. In highly
individualistic countries, relatively more importance is placed on freedom, challenge, and
earnings in work, and there is a preference for individual over group decisions.
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Masculinity/femininity refers to the degree to which social gender roles are clearly distinct in
society. In highly masculine societies, men are expected to be assertive and focused on
material success, while women are expected to be modest, nurturing, and focused on
relationships and quality of life issues. In highly feminine societies, gender role division is less
defined and has greater overlap. Men and women are expected to demonstrate “feminine”
characteristics of modesty, nurturing and concerns with quality of life issues. In highly
masculine countries, relatively more importance is placed on career advancement, material
wealth, recognition, and performance (as opposed to relationships).
Long term/short term orientation refers to the degree to which a society values the delay of
immediate gratification in favor of future rewards. In societies high on long term orientation,
emphasis is places on forward looking values such as perseverance and thrift. In societies high
on short term orientation, emphasis is placed on past and present values such as tradition,
preservation of “face”, and the fulfillment of social obligations. In highly long term oriented
countries, relatively less importance is placed on meritocracy (rewards based on abilities), and
relatively more importance is placed on building relationships and market position versus short
term profitability.

Schwartz’ Culture-Level Values
Schwartz (1994b) developed a set of six culture-level values: Conservatism, Autonomy
(intellectual/affective), Hierarchy, Mastery, Egalitarian commitment and Harmony.
Conservatism represents a preference for “maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and
avoidance of actions or inclinations of individuals that might disturb the traditional
order…Conservatism values are primarily concerned with security, conformity, and
tradition,”(p. 101).
Autonomy, the opposite of conservatism, represents a preference for individual nonconformity, described by Schwartz as follows: “…societies …view the person as an autonomous
entity entitled to pursue his or her individual interests and desires,”(p. 102). Autonomy is
sometimes broken into two separate culture level values, Affective autonomy and Intellectual
Autonomy.
Hierarchy represents a preference for clearly demarcated roles and responsibilities within a
society. Emphasis is placed on “the legitimacy of hierarchical role and resource allocation,”(p.
103).
Mastery represents the use of self-assertion to control one’s environment. Emphasis is placed
on “active efforts to modify one’s surroundings and get ahead of other people,”(p. 103).

108

Egalitarian commitment, the opposite of Hierarchy and Mastery, represents a commitment to
social welfare and equality. Emphasis is placed on the “…voluntary commitment to promoting
the welfare of other people…a social commitment that can occur among equals.” (p. 104).
Harmony represents harmony with nature and within society. Harmony and Egalitarian
commitment are closely related, and together form a broad “self-transcendence region” whose
values “stand in opposition to …. changing the world through self-assertion and exploitation of
people and resources,”(pp. 105-106).
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APPENDIX B - RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY (ROCE) REGRESSION RESULTS

Table 13. OLS Regression – Return on Common Equity
Panel A: Institutional Collectivism
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Institutional

Model 1
0.017
(0.592)
.084 **
(2.964)
-.110 ***
(-3.871)
-.065 **
(-2.298)
-.007
(-0.214)
-.047
(-1.619)
.003
(0.112)

Interactions
CD-Institutional x PolRisk

Model 2
.017
(0.592)
.084 **
(2.953)
-.110 ***
(-3.867)
-.065 **
(-2.297)
-.007
(-0.215)
-.047
(-1.615)
.003
(0.111)

.018
(0.599)
.084 **
(2.965)
-.110 ***
(-3.871)
-.065 **
(-2.293)
-.007
(-0.227)
-.047
(-1.602)

.025

.025

2

Model 4
.018
(0.598)
.084 **
(2.954)
-.110 ***
(-3.867)
-.065 **
(-2.292)
-.007
(-0.225)
-.047
(-1.601)

.004
(0.138)

.004
(0.139)

.004
(0.117)

.000
(0.013)
.004
(0.117)

.025

.025

.000
(-0.014)

CD-Institutional x FrostScore

R2

Model 3

.019
.019
.019
.018
Adjusted R
F
4.497 ***
3.932 ***
3.934 ***
3.494 ***
Standardized coefficients shown.
t-values in parentheses
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock.
SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = 3 year average company beta.
D:E = debt to equity ratio.
PolRisk = the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter
and host countries.
FrostScore = the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for
the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and
the political/regulatory environment distance.
CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance
and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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Table 13(Continued). OLS Regression – Return on Common Equity
Panel B: In-group Collectivism
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Ingroup

Model 1

Model 2

.017
(0.598)
.084 **
(2.962)
-.110 ***
(-3.875)
-.065 *
(-2.295)
-.008
(-0.268)
-.047
(-1.615)
0.001
(0.024)

.018
(0.600)
.084 **
(2.961)
-.110 ***
(-3.873)
-.065 *
(-2.292)
-.009
(-0.252)
-.047
(-1.612)
-0.001
(-0.025)

Interactions
CD-Ingroup x PolRisk

.017
(0.596)
.084 **
(2.960)
-.110 ***
(-3.872)
-.065 *
(-0.065)
-.008
(-0.263)
-.047
(-1.618)

.025

.025

2

Model 4
.017
(0.595)
.084 **
(2.959)
-.110 ***
(-3.868)
-.065 *
(-2.292)
-.008
(-0.221)
-.047
(-1.616)

0.002
(0.075)

0.002
(0.039)

.005
(0.167)

.000
(0.001)
.005
(0.161)

.025

.025

.003
(0.045)

CD-Ingroup x FrostScore

R2

Model 3

.019
.019
.019
.018
Adjusted R
F
4.496 ***
3.931 ***
3.934 ***
3.494 ***
Standardized coefficients shown.
t-values in parentheses
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock.
SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = 3 year average company beta.
D:E = debt to equity ratio.
PolRisk = the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter
and host countries.
FrostScore = the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for
the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and
the political/regulatory environment distance.
CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance
and the exchange disclosure score distance.

111

Table 13(Continued). OLS Regression – Return on Common Equity
Panel C: Uncertainty Avoidance
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Uncertainty Avoidance

Model 1

Model 2

Model 4

.018
(0.601)
.084 **
(2.963)
-.110 ***
(-3.872)
-.065 *
(-2.296)
-.008
(-0.279)
-.047
(-1.598)

.018
(0.601)
.084 **
(2.946)
-.110 ***
(-3.870)
-.065 *
(-2.295)
-.007
(-0.075)
-.047
(-1.597)

.018
(0.599)
.084 **
(2.963)
-.110 ***
(-3.870)
-.065 *
(-2.293)
-.006
(-0.178)
-.047
(-1.597)

.018
(0.599)
.084 **
(2.945)
-.110 ***
(-3.868)
-.065 *
(-2.292)
-.003
(-0.038)
-.047
(-1.595)

-.002
(-0.068)

-.002
(-0.066)

-.005
(-0.141)

-.006
(-0.137)

-.006
(-0.142)

.002
(0.027)
-.006
(-0.143)

.025

.025

Interactions
CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x PolRisk

.001
(0.016)

CD-Uncertainty Avoidance x FrostScore

R2

Model 3

.025
2

.025

.019
.019
.019
Adjusted R
F
4.496 ***
3.931 ***
3.934 ***
Standardized coefficients shown.
t-values in parentheses
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock.
SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = 3 year average company beta.
D:E = debt to equity ratio.
PolRisk = the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter
and host countries.
FrostScore = the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for
the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and
the political/regulatory environment distance.
CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance
and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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.018
3.494 ***

Table 13(Continued). OLS Regression – Return on Common Equity
Panel D: Power Distance
Variable
Control Variables
Mcap
SIC
Beta
D:E
PolRisk
FrostScore
Main Effects
CD - Power Distance

Model 1

Model 2
.018
(0.604)
.084 **
(2.955)
-.110 ***
(-3.876)
-.065 *
(-2.292)
-.011
(-0.317)
-.047
(-1.609)

.018
(0.603)
.084 **
(2.954)
-.110 ***
(-3.873)
-.065 *
(-2.291)
-.009
(-0.285)
-.047
(-1.604)

.018
(0.603)
.084 **
(2.952)
-.110 ***
(-3.872)
-.065 *
(-2.291)
-.011
(-0.310)
-.047
(-1.607)

-.003
(-0.100)

-.002
(-0.062)

-.003
(-0.064)

-.002
(-0.062)

.001
(0.019)

-.005
(-0.128)
-.001
(-0.020)
.025

-.005
(-0.128)

CD-Power Distance x FrostScore

2

Model 4

.018
(0.603)
.084 **
(2.958)
-.110 ***
(-3.876)
-.065 *
(-2.292)
-.009
(-0.292)
-.047
(-1.607)

Interactions
CD-Power Distance x PolRisk

R2

Model 3

.025

.025

.025

.019

.019

.019

.018
Adjusted R
F
4.497 ***
3.934 ***
3.932 ***
3.494 ***
Standardized coefficients shown.
t-values in parentheses
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10
MCap = Firm size, measured by the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock.
SIC = 4-digit standard industrial classification. Beta = 3 year average company beta.
D:E = debt to equity ratio.
PolRisk = the absolute difference between the ICRG political risk scores for the headquarter
and host countries.
FrostScore = the absolute difference between Frost et al.'s exchange disclosure scores for
the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional = the absolute value of the difference between the GLOBE institutional
collectivism scores for the headquarter and host countries.
CD-Institutional x PolRisk = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance and
the political/regulatory environment distance.
CD-Institutional x FrostScore = the interaction term for institutional collectivism distance
and the exchange disclosure score distance.
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